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Abstract	  
	  In	  2005,	  the	  Ontario	  Municipal	  Board	  responded	  to	  a	  citizen	  petition	  in	  London,	  Ontario	  by	  imposing	  significantly	  changed	  municipal	  wards	  for	  the	  2006	  municipal	  election.	  	  	  The	  case	  focused	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  using	  “communities	  of	  interest”	  in	  setting	  electoral	  boundaries.	  	  However,	  since	  the	  ward	  realignment,	  no	  evaluation	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  change	  has	  been	  undertaken	  until	  now.	  	  	  	  Interviews	  with	  14	  civically	  involved	  Londoners	  were	  held	  to	  determine	  personal	  attitudes	  on	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  ward	  realignment.	  	  Voter	  turnout,	  campaign	  expense,	  municipal	  budget	  and	  neighbourhood	  demographic	  data	  over	  10	  years	  was	  examined	  to	  identify	  any	  patterns	  that	  may	  have	  arisen.	  	  	  	  Upon	  investigation,	  voter	  turnout	  was	  shown	  to	  have	  increased	  significantly	  in	  the	  city’s	  urban	  wards	  after	  the	  2006	  realignment.	  	  By	  comparison,	  turnout	  in	  many	  suburban	  wards	  (where	  income	  and	  rates	  of	  home	  ownership	  are	  higher)	  changed	  at	  a	  rate	  significantly	  lower	  than	  the	  rate	  of	  change	  citywide.	  	  Voter	  turnout	  in	  each	  election	  since	  the	  year	  2000	  was	  consistently	  higher	  in	  the	  suburban	  wards	  than	  the	  city’s	  urban	  wards.	  	  After	  realignment,	  the	  gap	  in	  the	  level	  of	  voter	  turnout	  between	  the	  city’s	  core	  and	  the	  suburbs	  was	  markedly	  reduced.	  	  Strong	  correlations	  were	  shown	  between	  voter	  turnout	  and	  homeownership	  as	  well	  as	  between	  voter	  turnout	  and	  household	  income.	  	  These	  relationships	  were	  marginally	  weakened	  between	  the	  elections	  in	  2003	  and	  2006	  but	  the	  bond	  continued	  to	  show	  significant	  association	  despite	  realignment.	  Campaign	  expenditures	  were	  not	  shown	  to	  have	  been	  affected	  by	  realignment.	  	  As	  compared	  to	  overall	  changes	  in	  the	  municipal	  operations	  budget,	  a	  decrease	  in	  the	  Elected	  Officials	  budget	  and	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  Parks	  and	  Recreation	  budget	  were	  witnessed	  over	  the	  10-­‐year	  observation	  period.	  	  Interview	  subjects	  mostly	  concurred	  that	  improvement	  in	  municipal	  government	  had	  occurred	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  ward	  realignment	  but	  stressed	  that	  the	  success	  of	  government	  is	  entirely	  dependent	  on	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  representatives	  elected	  to	  office.	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Chapter	  1	  –	  Introduction	  	  	   In	  2005,	  in	  response	  to	  a	  citizen-­‐led	  petition,	  the	  Ontario	  Municipal	  Board	  (OMB)	  ordered	  London,	  Ontario’s	  city	  council	  to	  adopt	  a	  radical	  redivision	  and	  realignment	  of	  the	  city’s	  municipal	  electoral	  wards.	  	  The	  local	  government	  of	  the	  day	  was	  resistant	  to	  implement	  the	  realignment,	  however,	  and	  after	  exhausting	  its	  appeals	  through	  the	  courts,	  the	  City	  was	  required	  to	  implement	  the	  new	  boundaries	  in	  time	  for	  the	  2006	  municipal	  election.	  	  The	  case	  brought	  into	  debate	  significant	  issues	  surrounding	  municipal	  elections	  including	  the	  extent	  of	  a	  city	  council’s	  authority	  in	  Ontario,	  the	  principles	  of	  creating	  electoral	  districts,	  the	  need	  to	  represent	  “communities	  of	  interest”	  and	  the	  power	  of	  citizens	  to	  effect	  reform	  in	  government.	  	  Now,	  eight	  years	  and	  two	  elections	  later,	  it	  may	  be	  appropriate	  to	  revisit	  the	  landmark	  decision	  of	  the	  OMB	  and	  evaluate	  what	  effects,	  if	  any,	  it	  has	  had	  on	  the	  political	  landscape	  of	  London.	  	  	  	  	   Testing	  against	  the	  hypothesis,	  “There	  has	  been	  a	  significant	  improvement	  in	  the	  connection	  of	  citizens	  to	  their	  local	  government	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  2006	  ward	  boundary	  changes	  in	  London,	  Ontario,”	  this	  research	  will	  examine	  this	  hypothesis	  using	  the	  indicators	  of:	  stakeholder	  impressions;	  changes	  in	  voting	  behaviour;	  impact	  of	  household	  income	  and	  homeownership	  on	  voter	  turnout;	  municipal	  election	  campaign	  expenditures;	  and,	  London’s	  municipal	  budget	  before	  and	  after	  the	  change	  in	  city	  council’s	  structure.	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Background	  	   	  London,	  Ontario	  is	  a	  single-­‐tier	  municipality	  situated	  in	  Southwestern	  Ontario	  directly	  between	  Toronto	  and	  Detroit,	  approximately	  200	  kilometers	  from	  each.	  	  Established	  in	  1826,	  London	  now	  is	  home	  to	  over	  360,000	  residents	  and	  serves	  as	  an	  important	  economic	  hub	  for	  the	  region.	  	  In	  1854,	  when	  London	  had	  10,000	  residents,	  an	  Act	  was	  passed	  “incorporating	  London	  as	  a	  city	  with	  seven	  wards.”	  (Timeline	  1844-­‐1894	  Events	  for	  the	  City	  of	  London,	  Ontario).	  	  Since	  its	  establishment,	  London	  has	  grown	  to	  incorporate	  some	  neighbouring	  towns	  in	  its	  early	  years	  and	  later,	  through	  annexation,	  adding	  the	  villages	  of	  Byron	  in	  1961	  and	  Lambeth	  in	  1993	  (City	  of	  London).	  	  	  	  	   On	  several	  occasions,	  London	  has	  revisited	  its	  original	  seven	  ward	  structure	  and	  council	  composition	  considering	  alternative	  models	  for	  its	  governance.	  	  In	  1961,	  the	  Ontario	  Municipal	  Board	  ordered	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  Board	  of	  Control,	  as	  an	  addition	  to	  London’s	  council,	  adding	  four	  members	  elected	  at	  large	  to	  oversee	  the	  financial,	  personnel	  and	  property	  matters	  of	  the	  City.	  	  In	  1992,	  city	  council	  struck	  a	  task	  force	  to	  examine	  new	  ward	  boundaries	  in	  light	  of	  the	  impending	  annexation	  of	  Lambeth	  at	  the	  end	  of	  that	  year	  (Malpass).	  	  After	  the	  temporary	  addition	  of	  an	  eighth	  ward	  composed	  of	  the	  annexed	  lands,	  a	  new	  seven-­‐ward	  system	  was	  established,	  represented	  by	  two	  councillors	  elected	  in	  each	  ward,	  and	  the	  four	  controllers	  and	  mayor	  elected	  ‘at-­‐large’.	  	  The	  top	  two	  vote	  garnering	  candidates	  in	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each	  ward	  would	  receive	  a	  seat	  on	  council	  and	  the	  top	  four	  candidates	  for	  Board	  of	  Control	  would	  become	  controllers.	  	  Of	  those,	  the	  candidate	  receiving	  the	  most	  votes	  for	  controller	  would	  be	  appointed	  as	  deputy	  mayor.	  	  The	  wards	  were	  designed	  in	  a	  fashion	  similar	  to	  spokes	  on	  a	  wheel	  with	  pie-­‐shaped	  districts	  that	  spanned	  from	  the	  centre	  of	  the	  city	  to	  its	  periphery	  (Appendix	  1).	  This	  is	  the	  system	  remained	  in	  place	  for	  the	  next	  13	  years.	  	  	  	  	   Over	  time,	  some	  members	  of	  council	  grew	  dissatisfied	  with	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  local	  government.	  	  These	  councillors	  took	  issue	  with	  the	  perception	  that	  much	  of	  council’s	  power	  was	  consolidated	  in	  the	  Board	  of	  Control.	  	  Chief	  among	  those	  opposed	  to	  the	  status	  quo	  was	  Councillor	  Fred	  Tranquilli.	  	  In	  2002,	  Councillor	  Tranquilli	  authored	  a	  report	  titled	  “A	  Better	  Way:	  A	  Discussion	  Paper	  to	  Propose	  Improvements	  to	  Governance	  in	  London.”	  	  In	  his	  paper,	  Tranquilli	  proposed	  that	  city	  council’s	  structure	  should	  be	  changed	  from	  its	  19-­‐member	  format	  to	  an	  11-­‐member	  body.	  	  His	  proposal	  envisioned	  the	  elimination	  of	  the	  Board	  of	  Control	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  10	  wards	  served	  by	  one	  councillor	  each,	  working	  on	  a	  “full	  time”	  basis.	  	  Tranquilli	  had	  hoped	  to	  have	  these	  changes	  in	  place	  in	  time	  for	  the	  2003	  municipal	  election	  (Tranquilli).	  	  Tranquilli’s	  colleagues	  on	  council	  did	  agree	  to	  a	  review	  of	  council’s	  structure	  but	  instead	  chose	  to	  consider	  having	  any	  resulting	  changes	  in	  place	  for	  the	  2006	  election	  (Hallman).	  	  At	  that	  time,	  council	  also	  agreed	  to	  develop	  questions	  pertaining	  to	  council	  structure	  that	  would	  be	  placed	  on	  the	  2003	  municipal	  election	  ballot	  as	  a	  plebiscite	  (ibid).	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   Under	  the	  Municipal	  Elections	  Act	  of	  Ontario,	  Section	  8,	  questions	  can	  be	  put	  to	  electors	  regarding	  any	  issue	  that	  may	  be	  executed	  under	  a	  municipality’s	  statutory	  authority.	  	  These	  questions	  must	  be	  approved	  by	  city	  council	  at	  least	  six	  months	  prior	  to	  a	  municipal	  election	  and	  must	  appear	  on	  the	  election	  ballot	  (Municipal	  Elections	  Act,	  1996,	  S.O.	  1996,	  c.32	  Sched.).	  	  On	  December	  11,	  2002,	  members	  of	  a	  council	  working	  group	  put	  forward	  a	  series	  of	  questions	  for	  consideration	  to	  be	  placed	  on	  the	  2003	  ballot.	  In	  order	  for	  a	  municipal	  referendum	  to	  be	  binding,	  the	  Municipal	  Elections	  Act	  requires	  that	  at	  least	  50	  percent	  of	  all	  registered	  voters	  must	  cast	  ballots	  on	  the	  question	  in	  order	  for	  the	  results	  to	  be	  binding	  on	  the	  municipality.	  	  At	  the	  time	  they	  were	  considering	  the	  questions	  for	  the	  referendum,	  London	  city	  councillors	  were	  informed	  of	  this	  requirement	  in	  the	  Act.	  Councillors	  were	  also	  shown	  that	  since	  1973,	  there	  had	  not	  been	  a	  municipal	  election	  in	  London	  with	  more	  than	  46	  percent	  voter	  turnout	  (Fig.1)(Tolmie).	  	  	  
Figure	  1.	  
	  
	   10	  
	   Considering	  the	  options	  before	  them,	  on	  April	  22,	  2003,	  municipal	  council	  passed	  a	  bylaw	  to	  place	  the	  following	  questions	  onto	  the	  2003	  municipal	  election	  ballot:	  	   1. Are	  you	  in	  favour	  of	  reducing	  the	  present	  19	  member	  size	  of	  the	  Municipal	  Council	  of	  the	  City	  of	  London?	  	  2. Are	  you	  in	  favour	  of	  abolishing	  a	  Board	  of	  Control	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Municipal	  Council	  of	  the	  City	  of	  London?	  (Municipal	  Council	  of	  The	  Corporation	  of	  the	  City	  of	  London)	  	   On	  November	  10,	  2003,	  Londoners	  went	  to	  the	  polls	  to	  elect	  a	  new	  city	  council	  and	  to	  cast	  their	  ballots	  on	  the	  two	  referendum	  questions.	  	  By	  a	  margin	  of	  76.29	  percent,	  over	  65,000	  Londoners	  voted	  in	  favour	  of	  reducing	  the	  size	  of	  council.	  	  A	  smaller	  number,	  but	  still	  a	  majority	  (55.04%),	  voted	  to	  abolish	  the	  Board	  of	  Control.	  	  However,	  in	  that	  election,	  London’s	  voter	  turnout	  was	  only	  35.91	  percent	  thus	  resulting	  in	  an	  outcome	  that	  was	  not	  binding	  upon	  the	  City	  (City	  of	  London).	  	  It	  would	  be	  a	  year-­‐and-­‐a-­‐half	  before	  the	  new	  council	  considered	  how	  to	  address	  these	  results.	  	  In	  April,	  2005,	  facing	  a	  need	  to	  perform	  some	  realignment	  of	  wards	  due	  to	  the	  growing	  differences	  in	  population,	  the	  civic	  administration	  prepared	  four	  restructuring	  options	  for	  council	  to	  consider.	  	  Each	  of	  these	  options	  reflected	  a	  reduction	  in	  the	  size	  of	  council.	  	  Only	  two	  of	  the	  four	  options	  presented	  included	  abolishing	  the	  Board	  of	  Control	  (Fielding).	  	  Sitting	  as	  a	  Committee	  of	  the	  Whole,	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council	  held	  a	  public	  participation	  meeting	  on	  May	  17,	  2005	  to	  hear	  input	  on	  the	  four	  options.	  	  Eleven	  citizens	  gave	  presentations	  to	  council	  with	  most	  of	  them	  supporting	  the	  notion	  of	  creating	  smaller,	  single	  councillor	  wards	  and	  eliminating	  the	  Board	  of	  Control	  in	  keeping	  with	  the	  results	  of	  the	  2003	  referendum.	  	  Three	  of	  the	  participants	  present	  argued	  in	  favour	  of	  retaining	  the	  Board	  of	  Control.	  	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  five	  hour	  meeting,	  the	  Committee	  of	  the	  Whole	  voted	  to	  retain	  the	  existing	  governance	  system	  consisting	  of	  the	  Mayor,	  Board	  of	  Control,	  and	  two	  councillors	  in	  each	  of	  seven	  wards	  (City	  of	  London),	  thus	  choosing	  to	  take	  no	  action	  on	  the	  results	  of	  the	  referendum.	  	  	  	  Upset	  by	  the	  decision	  of	  council,	  an	  ad	  hoc	  citizen’s	  group	  calling	  itself	  
Imagine	  London,	  which	  had	  formed	  to	  review	  the	  proposed	  options	  for	  change	  in	  council	  structure,	  created	  a	  new	  14	  ward	  map	  (Appendix	  2)	  which	  it	  saw	  as	  better	  representing	  London’s	  neighbourhoods,	  or	  “communities	  of	  interest”.	  	  The	  group,	  led	  by	  University	  of	  Western	  Ontario	  Professor	  Sam	  Trosow,	  was	  comprised	  of	  representatives	  from	  community	  associations,	  unions,	  student	  groups	  and	  former	  members	  of	  city	  council.	  	  Imagine	  London	  then	  sought	  community	  support	  for	  its	  ward	  construct	  aiming	  to	  convince	  council	  to	  adopt	  a	  new	  15	  member	  council	  structure	  (14	  individual	  ward	  councillors	  plus	  mayor).	  	  In	  principle,	  the	  proposed	  structure	  would	  satisfy	  both	  of	  the	  conditions	  supported	  in	  the	  2003	  referendum	  (a	  smaller	  council	  and	  an	  abolished	  Board	  of	  Control).	  	  In	  just	  under	  two	  weeks,	  members	  of	  Imagine	  London	  were	  able	  to	  collect	  997	  signatures	  on	  a	  petition	  that	  read:	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   PETITION	  TO	  REDIVIDE	  THE	  CITY	  OF	  LONDON	  INTO	  14	  WARDS	  	  Persuant	  to	  Municipal	  Act	  Section	  223,	  the	  undersigned	  electors	  of	  the	  City	  of	  London	  petition	  City	  Council:	  	  
• To	  pass	  a	  by-­‐law	  redividing	  the	  municipality	  into	  14	  wards,	  to	  provide	  for	  a	  Council	  of	  15	  members	  consisting	  of	  one	  Mayor	  (elected	  city-­‐wide)	  and	  14	  Councillors	  (one	  elected	  in	  each	  Ward);	  and	  	  
• To	  pass	  a	  bylaw	  eliminating	  the	  Board	  of	  Control	  (City	  of	  London).	  	  	  	   Section	  223	  of	  the	  Ontario	  Municipal	  Act	  provides	  a	  mechanism	  for	  citizen	  appeal	  to	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  electoral	  wards	  are	  designated	  in	  a	  municipality.	  	  It	  has	  been	  used	  several	  times	  in	  Ontario’s	  history,	  but	  seldom	  successfully	  (The	  Corporation	  of	  the	  City	  of	  London).	  	  The	  section	  reads:	  	  	  Petition	  re:	  wards	  	  223.	  	  (1)	  	  Electors	  in	  a	  municipality	  may	  present	  a	  petition	  to	  the	  council	  asking	  the	  council	  to	  pass	  a	  by-­‐law	  dividing	  or	  redividing	  the	  municipality	  into	  wards	  or	  dissolving	  the	  existing	  wards.	  2001,	  c.	  25,	  s.	  223	  (1);	  2006,	  c.	  32,	  Sched.	  A,	  s.	  97	  (1).	  	  Number	  of	  electors	  required	  
	  (2)	  	  The	  petition	  requires	  the	  signatures	  of	  1	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  electors	  in	  the	  municipality	  or	  500	  of	  the	  electors	  in	  the	  municipality,	  whichever	  is	  less,	  but,	  in	  any	  event,	  a	  minimum	  of	  50	  signatures	  of	  the	  electors	  in	  the	  municipality	  is	  required.	  2001,	  c.	  25,	  s.	  223	  (2).	  (Municipal	  Act)	  	  	   The	  petition	  was	  presented	  to	  the	  City	  Clerk	  of	  London	  and,	  on	  June	  9,	  2005,	  the	  petition	  was	  certified	  under	  Section	  250	  of	  the	  Municipal	  Act	  as	  having	  been	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sufficiently	  signed	  by	  a	  minimum	  of	  500	  electors	  (Corporation	  of	  the	  City	  of	  London	  247).	  	  In	  fact,	  Imagine	  London	  had	  almost	  doubled	  the	  minimum	  threshold	  for	  this	  certification.	  	  The	  petition	  was	  included	  in	  the	  agenda	  package	  for	  councillors	  to	  consider	  on	  June	  13.	  	  In	  that	  meeting,	  Councillor	  Ab	  Chabar	  moved	  quickly	  to	  have	  the	  question	  of	  the	  petition	  ‘put’	  and	  this	  motion	  was	  passed	  by	  a	  vote	  of	  10	  to	  8	  (City	  of	  London).	  	  By	  having	  a	  question	  ‘put’	  (i.e.	  put	  to	  vote),	  council	  is	  forced	  to	  close	  any	  debate	  and	  vote	  directly	  on	  the	  issue	  at	  hand	  (Council	  Procedure	  By-­‐law).	  	  In	  short	  order,	  Deputy	  Mayor	  Tom	  Gosnell	  moved	  that	  the	  petition	  be	  noted	  and	  filed	  (i.e.	  to	  take	  no	  action)	  and	  the	  motion	  was	  carried	  without	  debate	  (City	  of	  London).	  	  	  	  	   Council’s	  failure	  to	  consider	  the	  petition	  and	  take	  action	  put	  in	  motion	  the	  next	  provision	  of	  Section	  223	  of	  the	  Municipal	  Act	  (223.(4)),	  which	  allows	  citizens	  to	  appeal	  to	  the	  Ontario	  Municipal	  Board	  when	  city	  council	  fails	  to	  enact	  a	  by-­‐law	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  demands	  of	  the	  petition	  (Municipal	  Act).	  	  	  	  	  	   On	  July	  11,	  2005,	  Dr.	  Trosow	  filed	  a	  submission	  to	  the	  OMB	  acting	  as	  the	  agent	  on	  behalf	  of	  four	  electors:	  Robert	  Porter,	  Stephen	  Turner,	  Beverly	  Wagar	  and	  Gil	  Warren.	  	  Two	  months	  later,	  the	  OMB	  heard	  the	  prehearing	  arguments	  to	  consider	  the	  breadth	  of	  authority	  held	  by	  the	  Board	  in	  determining	  the	  matter.	  	  The	  Member	  of	  the	  Board,	  Douglas	  Gates,	  decided	  that	  the	  OMB	  did	  not	  have	  the	  authority	  to	  hear	  arguments	  regarding	  the	  dissolution	  of	  the	  Board	  of	  Control	  as	  Section	  468	  of	  the	  Municipal	  Act	  (Board	  of	  Control,	  City	  of	  London)	  explicitly	  set	  out	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the	  conditions	  under	  which	  the	  Board	  of	  Control	  could	  be	  dissolved	  (namely,	  a	  two-­‐thirds	  majority	  vote	  of	  London’s	  city	  council	  in	  favour	  of	  dissolution)	  (Government	  of	  Ontario)	  (Gates).	  	  Gates,	  however,	  was	  clearly	  intrigued	  by	  the	  case	  and	  wrote	  in	  his	  decision,	  	  “This	  prehearing	  concerned	  the	  political	  organization	  of	  the	  City	  of	  London.	  	  How	  many	  wards	  should	  London	  have?	  	  Should	  the	  Board	  of	  Control	  continue	  to	  exist?	  	  How	  many	  Councillors	  per	  ward?	  	  Does	  the	  City	  control	  its	  own	  destiny?	  	  What	  questions	  could	  be	  more	  fundamental?	  ...Londoners	  should	  be	  proud	  there	  are	  so	  many	  citizens	  who	  are	  passionate	  about	  their	  City.”	  (Gates)	  	  	   During	  the	  course	  of	  the	  main	  hearing,	  Dr.	  Andrew	  Sancton	  from	  the	  University	  of	  Western	  Ontario,	  testifying	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  City,	  outlined	  five	  tests	  which	  needed	  to	  be	  considered	  in	  the	  setting	  electoral	  boundaries:	  1. Equitable	  representation;	  	  2. “Communities	  of	  interest”;	  3. Natural	  boundaries;	  4. Serve	  a	  larger	  public	  interest;	  and	  5. Broad	  public	  support	  (Gates)	  	  These	  tests	  were	  set	  out	  as	  a	  component	  of	  a	  case	  to	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Canada	  around	  which	  much	  of	  the	  evidence	  in	  the	  OMB	  hearing	  hinged.	  	  The	  principle	  of	  equitable	  representation	  is	  the	  overarching	  factor	  to	  be	  considered	  in	  setting	  electoral	  districts,	  ensuring	  that	  each	  person’s	  vote	  is	  equal	  to	  each	  other	  person’s	  vote.	  	  To	  accomplish	  this,	  then	  each	  electoral	  district	  would	  need	  to	  have	  the	  same	  number	  of	  people	  residing	  within.	  	  An	  earlier	  challenge	  to	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Canada,	  the	  ‘Carter	  case’	  as	  it	  later	  became	  to	  be	  known,	  had	  established	  an	  allowance	  for	  population	  variances	  between	  electoral	  districts	  of	  up	  to	  25	  percent	  to	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avoid	  running	  boundaries	  transecting	  “communities	  of	  interest”	  (Supreme	  Court	  of	  Canada).	  	  	   “Communities	  of	  Interest”	  are	  of	  importance	  in	  determining	  electoral	  boundaries	  and	  are	  mentioned	  explicitly	  in	  the	  guidelines,	  statutes	  or	  constitutions	  of	  numerous	  provinces	  and	  states	  including	  in	  the	  Canadian	  Electoral	  Boundaries	  Readjustment	  Act	  (Levitt)	  (Elections	  Canada).	  	  But	  what	  exactly	  are	  these	  “communities	  of	  interest”?	  Elections	  Canada	  explains	  it	  this	  way:	  “Community	  of	  interest	  is	  based	  on	  the	  recognition	  and	  acceptance	  of	  the	  idea	  that	  a	  geographically	  concentrated	  group	  shares	  a	  certain	  attribute	  in	  common.	  That	  attribute	  might	  be	  defined	  according	  to	  location,	  as	  with	  a	  neighborhood	  or	  a	  set	  of	  municipal	  boundaries;	  as	  the	  product	  of	  a	  common	  pursuit,	  such	  as	  an	  economic	  interest;	  or	  as	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  common	  trait,	  such	  as	  a	  social,	  racial,	  religious,	  or	  linguistic	  characteristic.”	  	  (Elections	  Canada)	  	  	  Elections	  Canada	  goes	  further	  to	  explain	  why	  communities	  of	  interest	  are	  so	  important	  that	  they	  would	  override	  the	  principle	  of	  absolute	  voter	  parity.	  	   “Community	  of	  interest	  is	  one	  of	  the	  fundamental	  principles	  of	  the	  electoral	  boundary	  readjustment	  process	  because:	  	  
• Strict	  population	  equality	  may	  well	  mean	  the	  splintering	  of	  otherwise	  natural	  communities	  of	  interest	  into	  various	  parts;	  	  
• Citizens	  naturally	  identify	  with	  communities	  of	  interest;	  	  
• Electors	  who	  identify	  with	  a	  community	  of	  interest	  within	  their	  riding	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  vote;	  	  
• Municipal	  and	  other	  local	  government	  districts	  form	  identifiable	  building	  blocks	  for	  the	  construction	  of	  larger	  electoral	  districts.”	  (ibid)	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The	  principle	  of	  communities	  of	  interest	  would	  become	  the	  central	  theme	  of	  the	  arguments	  before	  the	  OMB.	  	  	  	  	   In	  the	  case	  for	  Imagine	  London’s	  position,	  Dr.	  Trosow	  argued	  that	  London’s	  wards	  failed	  to	  clearly	  represent	  communities	  of	  interest.	  	  The	  wards,	  as	  they	  existed,	  were	  large,	  almost	  arbitrary	  swaths	  that	  spanned	  from	  the	  city’s	  core	  to	  the	  city’s	  edges	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  more	  represented	  seven	  at-­‐large	  districts	  than	  any	  identifiable	  communities.	  	  It	  was	  further	  argued	  that	  this	  system	  created	  an	  impediment	  to	  establishing	  effective	  representation,	  as	  the	  interests	  between	  communities	  within	  each	  ward	  were	  so	  diverse	  that	  conflict	  was	  inevitable.	  	  Evidence	  was	  presented	  at	  the	  hearing	  that	  candidates	  for	  council	  often	  prioritized	  campaigning	  to	  the	  suburban	  areas	  of	  the	  ward	  where	  voter	  turnout	  was	  highest	  ahead	  of	  those	  areas	  in	  the	  core	  where	  turnout	  was	  much	  lower.	  	  By	  extension,	  it	  was	  argued,	  that	  the	  same	  behaviour	  was	  prone	  to	  occur	  in	  the	  process	  of	  policy	  making	  once	  a	  candidate	  was	  elected	  to	  office	  (Gates,	  Decision	  Delivered	  by	  D.	  L.	  Gates)	  (Sher,	  OMB	  hears	  ward	  wars).	  	  	  	   Several	  arguments	  were	  made	  by	  the	  City	  in	  opposition	  to	  the	  realignment.	  	  These	  arguments	  included	  that	  the	  matter	  had	  been	  appropriately	  considered	  by	  council	  and	  had	  elected	  to	  maintain	  the	  status	  quo.	  	  As	  such,	  the	  OMB	  should	  have	  deference	  for	  decisions	  considered	  and	  executed	  by	  the	  municipal	  council.	  	  The	  City	  also	  argued	  that	  the	  existing	  ward	  boundaries	  met	  all	  the	  tests	  as	  required	  by	  the	  Carter	  decision.	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  When	  Mr.	  Gates	  asked	  how	  the	  7-­‐ward	  system	  reflected	  the	  communities	  of	  interest	  test,	  the	  City’s	  witness	  stated	  that	  the	  wards	  had	  been	  in	  place	  for	  so	  long	  that	  they	  “had	  become	  communities	  of	  interest”.	  	  	  Counsel	  for	  the	  City	  emphasized	  that	  a	  petition	  of	  1000	  electors	  was	  not	  an	  indication	  of	  “broad	  public	  support”,	  as	  the	  number	  of	  signatories	  on	  the	  petition	  represented	  only	  0.3	  %	  of	  the	  city’s	  population.	  	  As	  well,	  redrawing	  the	  ward	  map	  as	  requested	  by	  Imagine	  London	  would	  do	  nothing	  to	  satisfy	  the	  conditions	  of	  the	  results	  from	  the	  referendum.	  	  Since	  the	  OMB	  had	  determined	  it	  could	  not	  rule	  on	  the	  Board	  of	  Control	  issue,	  the	  Board	  of	  Control	  would	  still	  exist	  and	  council	  would	  remain	  the	  same	  size	  at	  19	  members.	  	  During	  the	  proceedings	  of	  the	  hearing,	  members	  of	  council	  opposing	  realignment,	  as	  well	  as	  opinion	  columnists,	  made	  accusations	  in	  the	  media	  of	  Gerrymandering	  and	  questioned	  how	  an	  OMB	  member	  from	  out	  of	  town	  could	  have	  an	  appreciation	  for	  the	  complexities	  of	  local	  civic	  affairs	  (Sher)	  (Martin).	  	  	  Ultimately,	  Mr.	  Gates	  ruled	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  Imagine	  London	  petition	  to	  redivide	  the	  city’s	  7	  wards	  into	  14	  wards,	  each	  represented	  by	  a	  single	  councillor,	  imposing	  a	  new	  ward	  map	  for	  the	  City	  of	  London	  (Appendix	  3).	  	  In	  a	  decision	  that	  left	  no	  question	  as	  to	  his	  thoughts	  on	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  ward	  structure	  at	  the	  time	  he	  said,	  “There	  is	  a	  pressing	  need	  for	  change…	  The	  board	  is	  convinced	  that	  the	  existing	  ward	  structure	  has	  undermined	  city	  council’s	  ability	  to	  connect	  with	  its	  citizens.	  (Gates)”	  	  Gates,	  however,	  was	  supportive	  of	  the	  continuation	  of	  the	  Board	  of	  Control	  stating	  that	  London	  would	  be	  in	  a	  “unique	  position”,	  as	  the	  only	  city	  in	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Canada	  with	  such	  a	  body	  and	  a	  14	  ward	  system	  with	  single	  councillors,	  providing	  for	  a	  “unique	  blend	  of	  central	  power	  and	  strong	  grassroots	  connections.”	  	  The	  City	  appealed	  Gates’	  decision	  to	  the	  Ontario	  courts,	  but	  it	  was	  ruled	  in	  both	  Divisional	  Court,	  and	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  that	  Gates	  had	  not	  exceeded	  his	  authority	  as	  a	  member	  of	  the	  OMB,	  nor	  had	  he	  erred	  in	  law	  in	  arriving	  at	  his	  decision.	  	  The	  City	  of	  London	  was	  left	  with	  no	  choice	  but	  to	  change	  the	  ward	  boundaries	  and	  the	  structure	  of	  governance	  in	  time	  for	  the	  2006	  municipal	  election.	  	  	  	  In	  the	  2006	  election,	  enough	  members	  of	  council	  were	  elected	  who	  supported	  abolishing	  the	  Board	  of	  Control.	  	  A	  motion	  was	  passed	  and	  a	  request	  was	  issued	  to	  the	  Province	  to	  change	  the	  provision	  in	  the	  Municipal	  Act	  requiring	  a	  2/3rds	  majority	  vote	  to	  remove	  the	  Board	  to	  one	  which	  required	  only	  simple	  majority.	  	  Once	  the	  Province	  made	  the	  change,	  on	  May	  25,	  2009,	  by	  a	  vote	  of	  13	  to	  6,	  a	  majority	  of	  members	  of	  council	  voted	  to	  abolish	  the	  Board	  of	  Control.	  	  The	  change	  would	  come	  into	  effect	  at	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  2006	  to	  2010	  council	  term.	  	  This	  ended	  the	  Board’s	  48-­‐year	  history	  in	  London	  and,	  thus,	  fulfilled	  the	  mandate	  from	  citizens	  expressed	  in	  the	  2003	  municipal	  referendum	  (City	  of	  London).	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Chapter	  2	  –	  Context	  from	  the	  Literature	  	  	  
The	  Urban	  Reform	  Movement	  	  	   The	  history	  of	  the	  urban	  reform	  movement	  near	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  20th	  century	  lends	  significant	  context	  to	  the	  ward	  redistribution	  debate	  in	  London,	  Ontario	  nearly	  100	  years	  later.	  	  At	  the	  time	  of	  urban	  reform,	  municipal	  politicians	  in	  the	  larger	  North	  American	  cities	  had	  become	  increasingly	  corrupt.	  	  Political	  parties	  were	  dominant	  in	  municipal	  politics	  but	  the	  politicians	  were	  generally	  uneducated	  in	  civic	  administration	  which	  led	  to	  extensive	  mismanagement	  of	  cities.	  	  With	  the	  parties’	  ‘ward	  bosses’	  controlling	  the	  regional	  expenditures	  of	  the	  city,	  they	  were	  able	  to	  amass	  personal	  wealth	  and	  solidify	  power	  by	  offering	  perks	  and	  jobs	  to	  supporters,	  thus	  securing	  their	  voting	  base.	  	  As	  jobs	  were	  difficult	  to	  come	  by	  for	  both	  recent	  immigrants	  and	  the	  working	  class,	  these	  groups	  became	  essential	  supporters	  for	  the	  political	  machines.	  	  While	  economically	  disadvantaged,	  immigrants	  and	  the	  working	  class	  held	  considerable	  collective	  influence	  on	  elections	  and	  were	  able	  to	  continue	  to	  prop	  up	  the	  ward	  bosses	  despite	  the	  growing	  corruption	  and	  administrative	  incompetence	  of	  these	  elected	  representatives	  (Rutherford).	  	  	  	   In	  response	  to	  these	  issues,	  urban	  reformists	  sought	  to	  decrease	  the	  regional	  clout	  held	  by	  the	  political	  parties	  by	  reducing,	  or	  eliminating	  ward	  based	  elections	  in	  favour	  of	  at-­‐large	  elections.	  	  Regional	  strongholds	  were	  believed	  to	  have	  been	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developed,	  in	  part,	  due	  to	  the	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  access	  ward-­‐bosses	  had	  with	  the	  smaller	  constituencies	  and	  ethnic	  groups	  within	  a	  ward.	  	  Citywide	  elections	  were	  seen	  as	  a	  way	  to	  break	  those	  local	  bonds.	  In	  several	  cities,	  including	  Toronto,	  Boards	  of	  Control	  were	  added	  to	  council	  structures	  in	  order	  to	  create	  a	  sort	  of	  ‘executive’	  with	  a	  broader	  citywide	  perspective,	  decreasing	  the	  influence	  of	  partisan	  politics	  within	  any	  of	  the	  remaining	  wards	  (ibid).	  	  However,	  the	  reformists	  soon	  found	  that	  these	  changes	  to	  municipal	  governance	  were	  not	  completely	  effective	  in	  solving	  the	  issue	  of	  having	  unlearned	  aldermen	  running	  the	  city.	  	  As	  such,	  they	  sought	  to	  transfer	  the	  administrative	  functions	  of	  government	  to	  more	  knowledgeable	  individuals	  by	  creating	  key	  administrative	  posts	  such	  as	  City	  Managers	  (ibid).	  	  This	  laid	  the	  groundwork	  for	  most	  of	  the	  modern	  day	  constructs	  of	  municipal	  government	  by	  creating	  a	  dichotomy	  of	  elected	  officials	  and	  a	  professional	  civic	  administration.	  	  London,	  Ontario	  did	  not	  have	  a	  Board	  of	  Control	  until	  1961	  and	  was	  ultimately	  the	  last	  in	  Canada	  to	  retain	  the	  body.	  Interestingly,	  London,	  Ontario	  also	  did	  not	  establish	  the	  post	  of	  Chief	  Administrative	  Officer	  until	  10	  years	  later	  in	  1971	  (Wells).	  	  	  	   While	  the	  movement	  from	  ward-­‐based	  elections	  to	  citywide	  elections	  had	  some	  role	  in	  the	  reduction	  of	  corruption,	  the	  most	  effective	  reform	  to	  reduce	  corruption	  in	  municipal	  government	  was	  indeed	  the	  creation	  of	  an	  appointed	  municipal	  civil	  service.	  	  The	  removal	  of	  direct	  access	  to	  the	  municipal	  coffers	  by	  aldermen	  significantly	  decreased	  the	  patronage	  opportunities	  for	  the	  political	  machines.	  	  However,	  the	  most	  significant	  impact	  of	  the	  movement	  away	  from	  ward-­‐
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based	  elections	  was	  the	  de-­‐emphasis	  of	  the	  voting	  power	  of	  the	  ethnic	  and	  working	  class	  populations	  in	  the	  city’s	  neighbourhoods.	  	  However,	  some	  later	  saw	  the	  push	  for	  at-­‐large	  elections	  as	  elitist	  as	  it	  emphasized	  the	  middle	  and	  upper	  class	  vote	  and	  de-­‐emphasized	  the	  vote	  of	  the	  working	  class	  (ibid)	  (DiGaetano).	  	  	  	   Due	  to	  several	  factors,	  the	  mid	  1900s	  saw	  the	  return	  of	  ward-­‐based	  elections.	  	  Municipalities	  were	  running	  much	  more	  effectively	  as	  a	  result	  of	  a	  maturing	  civil	  service	  and	  the	  corruption	  of	  politicians	  was	  seen	  to	  have	  been	  significantly	  decreased	  (as	  compared	  to	  the	  mid	  1800s).	  	  Cities	  had	  also	  grown	  in	  size	  to	  the	  point	  where	  it	  was	  difficult	  to	  effectively	  represent	  citizens	  in	  electoral	  systems	  that	  were	  exclusively	  at-­‐large.	  Hence,	  a	  shift	  began	  back	  towards	  regional	  representation	  in	  local	  government	  occurred.	  	  There	  is	  now	  a	  spectrum	  of	  models	  of	  representative	  democracy	  employed	  by	  municipalities	  across	  North	  America.	  	  Some	  municipalities	  have	  retained	  an	  at-­‐large	  structure	  for	  their	  city	  councils	  without	  any	  members	  elected	  in	  wards,	  whereas	  others	  have	  completely	  discarded	  at-­‐large	  electoral	  systems	  in	  favour	  of	  wards.	  	  Yet	  some	  other	  cities	  have	  retained	  or	  established	  a	  hybridized	  model	  of	  government	  where	  some	  members	  are	  elected	  in	  wards	  and	  others	  at	  large	  (The	  Corporation	  of	  the	  City	  of	  London).	  	  Such	  was	  the	  case	  in	  London,	  Ontario	  where	  councillors	  were	  elected	  in	  wards	  and	  the	  members	  of	  the	  Board	  of	  Control	  were	  chosen	  in	  at-­‐large	  elections.	  	  Today,	  all	  larger	  single	  tier	  municipalities	  in	  Ontario	  (population	  >150,000)	  now	  have	  city	  councils	  composed	  exclusively	  of	  councillors	  elected	  in	  wards	  and	  a	  mayor	  elected	  at-­‐large	  (Appendix	  4).	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Redistricting	  	   	  With	  the	  potential	  to	  literally	  reshape	  the	  political	  landscape,	  the	  process	  establishing	  or	  realigning	  electoral	  boundaries	  can	  be	  a	  ‘hot	  potato’.	  	  	  As	  population	  densities	  change	  within	  electoral	  boundaries,	  national	  and	  subnational	  governments	  are	  forced	  to	  revisit	  these	  districts	  with	  some	  regularity.	  	  Chapter	  3	  of	  the	  Charter	  of	  
Rights	  and	  Freedoms	  of	  Canada	  states,	  “Every	  citizen	  of	  Canada	  has	  the	  right	  to	  vote	  in	  an	  election	  of	  members	  of	  the	  House	  of	  Commons	  or	  of	  a	  legislative	  assembly	  and	  to	  be	  qualified	  for	  membership	  therein.”	  (The	  Government	  of	  Canada).	  	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Canada	  has	  ruled,	  by	  extension,	  that	  each	  person’s	  vote	  must	  have	  equal	  power	  and	  this	  is	  ensured	  through	  maintaining	  electoral	  districts	  of	  equal	  size	  (The	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Canada).	  	  There	  is,	  however,	  a	  caveat	  that	  electoral	  districts	  must	  also	  reflect	  “communities	  of	  interest”.	  	  This	  caveat	  allows	  for	  some	  latitude	  in	  the	  size	  of	  the	  electoral	  district	  by	  population	  and	  is	  generally	  accepted	  as	  providing	  for	  up	  to	  25	  percent	  variance	  in	  district	  size	  (ibid).	  	  	  	  	   Historically,	  redistricting	  has	  presented	  opportunities	  to	  the	  legislators	  holding	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  to	  extend	  an	  electoral	  advantage	  by	  shaping	  districts	  in	  such	  a	  manner	  that	  would	  provide	  an	  increased	  likelihood	  of	  electing	  peers	  of	  common	  interest.	  	  This	  was	  the	  case	  in	  the	  classic	  example	  of	  Gerrymandering.	  	  In	  1812,	  in	  Elbridge	  Gerry,	  then	  Governor	  of	  Massachusetts,	  USA,	  signed	  new	  state	  districts	  into	  law	  that	  would	  benefit	  his	  party	  in	  future	  elections.	  	  One	  district	  that	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was	  obviously	  designed	  for	  political	  advantage	  was	  so	  oddly	  shaped	  that	  it	  looked	  like	  a	  salamander.	  	  On	  March	  26,	  1812,	  The	  Boston	  Globe	  coined	  the	  term	  ‘Gerrymandering’	  as	  a	  combination	  of	  Governor	  Gerry’s	  name	  and	  ‘salamander’	  (Barash).	  	  As	  a	  result,	  redistricting	  exercises	  are	  now	  often	  questioned	  as	  to	  whether	  they	  are	  being	  undertaken	  with	  the	  public	  interest	  at	  heart	  or	  to	  provide	  electoral	  advantage	  to	  those	  currently	  in	  power.	  	  To	  alleviate	  these	  concerns,	  the	  process	  of	  identifying	  new	  potential	  municipal	  electoral	  boundaries	  is	  often	  left	  to	  senior	  levels	  of	  government,	  non-­‐partisan	  bureaucratic	  or	  technical	  bodies,	  quasi-­‐judicial	  boards	  or	  independent	  commissions	  (Higgins).	  	  	  	   Most	  states	  and	  provinces	  now	  recognize	  a	  general	  set	  of	  principles	  that	  should	  be	  involved	  when	  undertaking	  redistricting.	  As	  mentioned	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  these	  considerations	  need	  to	  include	  equitable	  representation,	  communities	  of	  interest,	  natural	  boundaries,	  serving	  the	  broader	  public	  interest	  and	  having	  broad	  public	  support.	  	  While	  often	  redistricting	  occurs	  as	  a	  result	  of	  population	  changes,	  occasionally	  other	  interests	  become	  influencing	  factors.	  	  This	  is	  usually	  where	  communities	  of	  interest	  play	  a	  large	  role	  and	  also	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  ignite	  the	  people’s	  passions.	  	  In	  Ontario,	  the	  importance	  of	  this	  is	  evidenced	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  only	  item	  in	  the	  Municipal	  Act	  that	  allows	  a	  petition	  of	  electors	  to	  be	  taken	  to	  the	  Ontario	  Municipal	  Board	  for	  adjudication	  is	  in	  the	  assignment	  of	  ward	  boundaries	  of	  a	  municipality.	  	  The	  framers	  of	  provincial	  legislation	  in	  Ontario	  appear	  to	  have	  recognized	  the	  need	  for	  impartial	  adjudication	  in	  the	  matter	  of	  setting	  electoral	  districts	  in	  municipalities.	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  So	  what,	  then,	  are	  the	  effects	  of	  redistricting?	  	  It	  must	  be	  asked	  if	  redistricting	  is	  a	  neutral	  exercise	  or	  if	  there	  are	  indeed	  impacts	  associated	  with	  “moving	  the	  lines	  on	  the	  map.”	  	  Previous	  studies	  have	  evaluated	  these	  effects	  to	  some	  degree.	  	  Specifically,	  redistricting	  should	  be	  evaluated	  to	  determine	  if	  there	  was	  any	  change	  in	  voter	  participation,	  regional	  government	  expenditures,	  or	  advantages	  to	  candidates	  with	  certain	  political	  ideologies.	  	  	  	  	   Gilligan	  and	  Matsusaka	  examined	  the	  public	  choice	  principles	  of	  redistricting	  to	  determine	  if	  certain	  models	  of	  electoral	  districting	  held	  any	  advantage	  or	  bias	  to	  political	  ideologies.	  	  They	  determined	  that,	  in	  fact,	  randomly	  creating	  districts	  to	  solely	  reflect	  a	  parity	  of	  population	  in	  each	  region	  did	  not	  eliminate	  policy	  bias.	  	  The	  most	  effective	  redistricting	  method	  to	  minimize	  the	  chance	  of	  the	  enactment	  of	  nonmajoritarian	  policy	  was	  in	  using	  the	  traditional	  principles	  of	  creating	  “compact,	  contiguous	  districts	  that	  respected	  existing	  political	  boundaries.”	  (Gilligan	  and	  Matsusaka)	  	  Another	  study	  examined	  ward	  versus	  at-­‐large	  elections	  to	  determine	  the	  effects	  on	  regional	  municipal	  spending	  (Langbein,	  Crewson	  and	  Brasher).	  	  The	  authors	  found	  that	  in	  cities	  with	  wards,	  spending	  on	  services	  considered	  favourable	  was	  relatively	  equally	  distributed	  across	  the	  city.	  	  However,	  the	  authors	  also	  found	  that	  in	  cities	  with	  wards	  there	  was	  an	  unequal	  distribution	  of	  locally	  unwanted	  land	  uses	  (LULUs)	  indicating	  that	  perhaps,	  while	  regionalized	  spending	  biases	  had	  not	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occurred,	  certain	  wards	  were	  more	  effective	  than	  others	  to	  prevent	  the	  placement	  of	  LULUs	  in	  their	  neighbourhoods.	  	  This	  is	  significant	  to	  note	  when	  considered	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  municipal	  political	  environment	  prior	  to	  Urban	  Reform.	  	  Prior	  to	  reform,	  wards	  were	  seen	  as	  the	  vehicles	  to	  providing	  perks	  to	  neighbourhood	  interests,	  whereas	  after	  the	  return	  of	  ward-­‐based	  elections,	  this	  no	  longer	  seems	  to	  hold	  true.	  	  	  	  	   Finally,	  Hayes	  and	  McKee	  studied	  a	  period	  of	  three	  elections	  in	  Texas,	  USA	  to	  determine	  what	  effects,	  if	  any,	  redistricting	  had	  on	  voter	  participation.	  	  They	  found	  a	  3%	  to	  8%	  decrease	  in	  voter	  turnout	  in	  areas	  that	  had	  experienced	  redistricting	  as	  compared	  to	  those	  areas	  that	  had	  not.	  	  This	  creates	  a	  basis	  for	  concern	  where	  redistricting	  occurs	  in	  some,	  but	  not	  all,	  of	  the	  districts	  within	  that	  level	  of	  government	  (Hayes	  and	  McKee).	  	  	  	  
Voter	  Turnout	  	  	  	   One	  of	  the	  intended	  objectives	  of	  the	  push	  for	  ward	  boundary	  realignment	  in	  London,	  Ontario,	  was	  to	  equalize	  the	  level	  of	  representation	  between	  areas	  of	  the	  city	  with	  lower	  voter	  turnout	  with	  those	  of	  higher	  voter	  turnout.	  	  It	  is	  important,	  then,	  to	  examine	  what	  factors	  are	  associated	  with	  low	  and	  high	  voter	  participation.	  	  In	  Canada,	  there	  is	  a	  marked	  difference	  in	  voter	  turnout	  between	  federal,	  provincial	  and	  municipal	  elections.	  	  While	  the	  most	  direct	  delivery	  of	  government	  services	  occurs	  at	  the	  municipal	  level,	  paradoxically,	  of	  the	  three	  levels	  of	  government,	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turnout	  is	  lowest	  for	  municipal	  elections.	  	  In	  2008,	  turnout	  was	  72.8%	  for	  federal	  elections,	  72.2%	  for	  provincial	  elections	  and	  58.8%	  for	  municipal	  elections	  (Statistics	  Canada).	  	  	  	   Many	  studies	  have	  examined	  voter	  behaviour	  and	  positive	  correlations	  have	  been	  demonstrated	  between	  voter	  turnout	  and	  income,	  home	  ownership,	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  contact	  with	  candidates	  and	  availability	  of	  information	  about	  the	  candidate	  (Niven)	  (Kushner	  and	  Siegel)	  (Geys).	  	  Kushner	  and	  Seigel	  describe	  “the	  person	  most	  likely	  to	  vote”	  as	  “a	  senior,	  upper	  income,	  born	  outside	  Canada,	  owning	  their	  own	  home,	  and	  politically	  and	  community	  involved	  (Kushner	  and	  Siegel).”	  	  It	  must	  then	  be	  asked	  if	  this	  demonstrates	  a	  disadvantage	  in	  the	  ability	  to	  have	  policy	  reflect	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  younger,	  lower	  income	  renters	  in	  a	  community.	  	  Patrick	  Flavin	  investigated	  voter	  turnout	  levels	  amongst	  lower	  income	  Americans	  and	  found	  little	  evidence	  that	  increasing	  voting	  rates	  among	  this	  population	  also	  increased	  any	  advancement	  of	  their	  interests	  by	  their	  representative	  senator	  (Flavin).	  	  However,	  this	  study	  examined	  these	  behaviours	  at	  a	  nation-­‐wide	  level	  in	  areas	  where	  the	  electoral	  district	  boundaries	  were	  static	  and.	  	  It	  is	  reasonable	  to	  predict	  that	  these	  results	  would	  not	  necessarily	  be	  generalizable	  at	  the	  subnational	  level	  or	  where	  electoral	  districts	  were	  changed	  to	  better	  reflect	  regional	  socioeconomic	  demographics.	  Representatives	  in	  smaller	  districts	  who	  are	  closer	  to	  the	  people	  may	  behave	  quite	  differently	  than	  their	  senior	  level	  government	  counterparts.	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Chapter	  3	  –	  Methods	  
	  	   Both	  quantitative	  and	  qualitative	  data	  collection	  techniques	  were	  employed	  to	  test	  the	  study	  hypothesis.	  	  Publicly	  available	  data	  on	  past	  election	  results;	  municipal	  budgets;	  population	  demographics;	  and,	  candidate	  campaign	  expenses	  were	  examined	  to	  identify	  trends	  and	  changes	  that	  could	  possibly	  be	  attributed	  to	  the	  restructuring	  of	  city	  council	  in	  2006.	  	  Interviews	  were	  then	  performed	  with	  key	  stakeholders	  to	  corroborate	  these	  findings.	  	  	  	  	  
Voter	  turnout	  	   Ward-­‐by-­‐ward	  voter	  turnout	  was	  compared	  in	  each	  of	  four	  London	  municipal	  elections	  (2000,	  2003,	  2006	  and	  2010)	  to	  determine	  if	  there	  was	  any	  changes	  in	  voter	  behaviour	  that	  could	  be	  attributed	  to	  the	  ward	  boundary	  realignment	  occurred	  (City	  of	  London).	  	  This	  sample	  represented	  data	  from	  two	  elections	  prior	  to	  the	  2005	  OMB	  decision	  and	  two	  elections	  after	  the	  decision	  was	  implemented.	  	  	  	  To	  develop	  a	  framework	  for	  comparison,	  the	  former	  seven-­‐ward	  system	  was	  deconstructed	  to	  identify	  results	  from	  the	  individual	  polling	  stations.	  	  Those	  polling	  stations	  were	  then	  paired	  geographically	  to	  their	  location	  within	  the	  new	  14-­‐ward	  system	  and	  used	  to	  determine	  the	  number	  of	  eligible	  voters	  and	  ballots	  cast	  for	  an	  election-­‐to-­‐election	  comparison	  in	  each	  ward	  over	  the	  four	  sample	  years.	  	  Advanced	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polls	  created	  some	  difficulty	  in	  this	  calculation,	  as	  voters	  in	  those	  polls	  weren’t	  attributed	  to	  their	  originally	  assigned	  polling	  station.	  	  To	  address	  this	  issue,	  the	  number	  of	  “new	  ward”	  polls	  within	  each	  old	  ward	  was	  calculated	  and	  the	  relative	  proportion	  determined.	  	  The	  total	  votes	  cast	  in	  each	  advanced	  poll	  were	  then	  proportionately	  added	  to	  the	  calculated	  totals	  for	  the	  new	  ward.	  	  Relative	  changes	  in	  voter	  turnout	  in	  each	  ward	  was	  compared	  to	  the	  change	  in	  voter	  turnout	  citywide	  and	  examined	  for	  significance	  by	  calculating	  the	  95%	  and	  99%	  confidence	  intervals	  using	  a	  two-­‐tailed	  t	  test	  around	  the	  actual	  citywide	  voter	  turnout	  percentage	  (Hassard).	  	  	  	  
Demographics	  	   Previous	  studies	  have	  shown	  a	  positive	  correlation	  between	  voter	  turnout	  and	  income	  as	  well	  as	  voter	  turnout	  and	  home	  ownership	  in	  municipal	  elections	  (Geys).	  	  To	  test	  this,	  demographic	  information	  was	  gathered	  from	  London’s	  planning	  districts	  as	  compiled	  during	  the	  2006	  census	  (City	  of	  London).	  	  Each	  planning	  district	  was	  evaluated	  to	  determine	  in	  to	  which	  electoral	  ward	  it	  fell	  (Appendix	  5).	  	  Household	  income	  and	  percentage	  of	  residents	  who	  owned	  their	  homes	  for	  each	  ward	  were	  then	  determined	  using	  a	  weighted	  average	  from	  all	  the	  planning	  districts	  within	  the	  ward	  (Appendix	  6).	  	  Data	  was	  processed	  by	  SPSS	  and	  associations	  between	  voter	  turnout	  and	  income	  or	  homeownership	  were	  tested	  for	  correlation	  using	  the	  Pearson	  product-­‐moment	  correlation	  coefficient.	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Municipal	  Budget	  	   Three	  lines	  were	  identified	  in	  the	  City	  of	  London	  operations	  budget	  as	  being	  potentially	  impacted	  by	  a	  possible	  increased	  focus	  on	  neighbourhood	  issues	  as	  a	  result	  of	  realignment	  (City	  of	  London).	  	  The	  budget	  lines	  of	  ‘Neighbourhood	  and	  Children’s	  Services’	  and	  ‘Parks	  and	  Recreation’	  were	  chosen	  as	  these	  two	  lines	  were	  most	  directly	  associated	  with	  the	  delivery	  of	  services	  to	  neighbourhoods.	  	  The	  line	  ‘Elected	  Officials’	  was	  evaluated	  for	  any	  relationship	  between	  the	  ward	  boundary	  redistribution	  and	  costs	  associated	  with	  councillor	  remuneration.	  	  	  	  
Campaign	  Expenditures	  	  	   The	  increase	  in	  the	  average	  total	  campaign	  expenses	  recorded	  for	  the	  winning	  candidates	  in	  each	  ward	  for	  the	  years	  2000,	  2003	  and	  2010	  were	  compared	  against	  the	  increase	  in	  inflation	  over	  the	  periods	  2000	  to	  2003,	  2003	  to	  2010	  and	  2000	  to	  2010	  to	  determine	  whether	  there	  was	  any	  change	  in	  the	  expenses	  over	  time	  (Trosow)	  (Thompson).	  	  Campaign	  expenses	  were	  as	  reported	  to	  the	  City	  of	  London	  in	  the	  official	  candidate	  expense	  reports	  and	  the	  changes	  in	  inflation	  were	  obtained	  from	  the	  Bank	  of	  Canada	  website	  (Bank	  of	  Canada).	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Stakeholder	  Interviews	  
	  	   Thirteen	  identified	  stakeholders	  and	  interested	  parties	  were	  questioned	  in	  eight	  separate	  interviews	  to	  determine	  their	  perceptions	  on	  the	  benefits	  and	  detriments	  to	  the	  city	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  ward	  boundary	  realignment.	  	  Ten	  questions	  were	  asked	  of	  the	  participants	  and	  further	  ad	  hoc	  questioning	  was	  pursued	  to	  expand	  on	  responses	  of	  interest.	  	  These	  questions	  were:	  	   1. Can	  you	  tell	  me	  your	  impressions	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  2006	  ward	  boundary	  realignment	  in	  London	  Ontario	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  new	  electoral	  districts	  themselves	  (14	  wards	  with	  one	  councillor	  each	  as	  compared	  to	  the	  previous	  7	  ward,	  2	  councillor	  per	  ward	  system)?	  	  	  	  2. Did	  you	  support	  the	  initiative	  at	  the	  time?	  	   3. Do	  you	  support	  the	  initiative	  now?	  	  4. Overall,	  do	  you	  consider	  the	  realignment	  itself	  to	  have	  been	  beneficial	  or	  detrimental	  to	  London’s	  municipal	  government	  and	  it’s	  connection	  with	  citizens?	  	   5. What	  specific	  benefits	  can	  you	  think	  have	  occurred	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  realignment?	  	   6. What	  specific	  detriments	  do	  you	  think	  have	  occurred	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  realignment?	  	   7. Do	  you	  perceive	  any	  changes	  to	  have	  occurred	  with	  the	  level	  of	  citizen	  engagement	  and	  local	  representation	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  boundary	  realignment?	  	   8. Specifically	  considering	  the	  core	  areas	  of	  the	  city	  (downtown,	  old	  east,	  old	  north,	  old	  south),	  do	  you	  perceive	  there	  to	  have	  been	  any	  change	  in	  the	  level	  of	  attention	  paid	  by	  the	  municipal	  government	  and/or	  civic	  administration	  to	  these	  neighbourhoods?	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9. Specifically	  considering	  the	  peripheral	  /	  subdivision	  areas	  of	  the	  city,	  do	  you	  perceive	  there	  to	  have	  been	  any	  change	  in	  the	  level	  of	  attention	  paid	  by	  the	  municipal	  government	  and/or	  civic	  administration	  to	  these	  neighbourhoods?	  	  	  	   10. Thinking	  about	  London’s	  ward	  councillors	  over	  the	  past	  10	  years,	  do	  you	  perceive	  any	  changes	  in	  their	  level	  of	  advocacy	  for	  their	  wards	  vs.	  their	  advocacy	  for	  citywide	  issues	  or	  their	  ability	  to	  balance	  the	  two	  interests?	  	  	  	  	  	   Interviews	  were	  conducted	  either	  in	  person	  or	  by	  phone.	  	  In	  person	  interviews	  were	  audio	  recorded	  and,	  in	  both	  cases,	  the	  interviewer	  took	  handwritten	  notes.	  	  	  Participants	  were	  advised	  that	  their	  participation	  was	  completely	  voluntary	  and	  that	  they	  could	  choose	  to	  not	  answer	  any	  or	  all	  of	  the	  questions	  in	  the	  interview.	  	  The	  approval	  of	  The	  University	  of	  Western	  Ontario’s	  Political	  Science	  Departmental	  Research	  Ethics	  Board	  was	  obtained	  prior	  to	  commencing	  interviews.	  	  Notes	  and	  recordings	  were	  later	  reviewed	  and	  compiled	  into	  eight	  vignettes	  capturing	  the	  key	  points	  raised	  during	  the	  interviews.	  	  	  	   Respondents	  were	  not	  randomly	  selected	  but	  rather	  specifically	  selected	  for	  their	  knowledge	  of	  local	  municipal	  affairs,	  their	  involvement	  with	  their	  local	  communities,	  their	  professional	  experience	  and,	  in	  a	  few	  cases,	  for	  their	  direct	  involvement	  in	  the	  OMB	  hearing	  on	  ward	  boundary	  realignment.	  	  These	  respondents	  also	  were	  known	  to	  hold	  diverse	  views	  on	  realignment	  prior	  to	  the	  OMB	  decision	  in	  2005.	  	  The	  participants	  included	  two	  local	  journalists,	  two	  local	  politicians	  in	  London’s	  municipal	  government,	  three	  neighbourhood	  associations,	  and	  two	  academics	  who	  were	  involved	  in	  the	  hearing.	  	  Two	  members	  of	  the	  civic	  administration	  were	  asked	  to	  participate	  but	  did	  not	  respond	  to	  the	  request.	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Chapter	  4	  -­‐	  Interviews	  
	  
The	  City	  Hall	  Reporters	  	  
Chip	  Martin	  	   Brian	  “Chip”	  Martin	  (63)	  has	  been	  following	  municipal	  affairs	  in	  London	  for	  over	  four	  decades.	  	  Being	  a	  reporter	  for	  the	  London	  Free	  Press,	  Chip	  has	  been	  very	  close	  to	  the	  issues	  surrounding	  the	  city	  and	  the	  people	  involved	  in	  its	  operation.	  	  He	  is	  quite	  forthcoming	  about	  his	  disagreement	  with	  the	  ward	  boundary	  realignment	  and	  he	  especially	  dislikes	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Board	  of	  Control	  was	  eliminated.	  	  He	  did	  not	  support	  the	  Imagine	  London	  initiative	  in	  2005	  and	  continues	  to	  have	  concerns	  now.	  	  “Why	  throw	  the	  baby	  out	  with	  the	  bathwater?”	  he	  asks,	  referring	  to	  the	  elements	  of	  civic	  governance	  he	  considered	  to	  be	  very	  effective	  prior	  to	  realignment.	  	  	  	   Mr.	  Martin	  saw	  merit	  in	  having	  2	  councillors	  per	  ward.	  	  He	  believes	  that	  with	  two	  councillors,	  if	  one	  were	  unable	  to	  get	  the	  attention	  of	  one	  of	  their	  councillors	  on	  an	  issue,	  they	  would	  always	  have	  the	  other	  councillor	  to	  turn	  to.	  	  The	  former	  system	  also	  allowed	  for	  someone	  to	  be	  covering	  the	  ward	  at	  all	  times	  should	  one	  councillor	  be	  absent	  for	  vacation,	  work	  or	  illness,	  for	  example.	  	  To	  illustrate	  this,	  Chip	  cites	  a	  recent	  development	  project	  in	  London	  around	  which	  there	  was	  much	  opposition	  from	  the	  neighbourhood.	  The	  councillor	  for	  that	  ward	  supported	  the	  project	  and	  chose	  to	  ignore	  any	  correspondence	  from	  those	  who	  were	  opposed.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  residents	  in	  the	  ward	  were	  “stuck	  with	  the	  ideology”	  of	  their	  one	  representative	  and	  had	  to	  seek	  support	  and	  guidance	  from	  sympathetic	  councillors	  in	  other	  wards.	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Chip	  does	  concede	  that	  there	  is	  merit	  in	  having	  a	  ‘downtown’	  councillor,	  creating	  an	  advocate	  to	  address	  unique	  issues	  surrounding	  the	  city’s	  core.	  	  He	  also	  sees	  value	  in	  having	  smaller	  wards.	  	  The	  new	  wards	  provide	  a	  smaller	  geographic	  area	  for	  a	  councillor	  to	  represent.	  	  As	  for	  whether	  there	  is	  now	  increased	  engagement	  in	  London’s	  neighbourhoods	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  realignment,	  Martin	  remains	  unconvinced.	  	  He	  acknowledges	  that	  since	  realignment	  there	  has	  indeed	  been	  an	  increase	  in	  city	  staff	  attention	  to	  neighbourhood	  issues	  and	  citizen	  engagement	  but	  he	  wonders	  if	  this	  is	  perhaps	  more	  a	  function	  of	  improved	  technology	  for	  communications	  (i.e.	  internet	  and	  social	  media)	  and	  a	  more	  demanding	  public.	  	  	  	   Mr.	  Martin	  laments	  the	  loss	  of	  the	  Board	  of	  Control,	  which	  provided	  four	  members	  of	  council	  who	  would	  bring	  a	  ‘city-­‐wide’	  perspective	  to	  the	  council	  horseshoe.	  	  He	  has	  concerns	  about	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  well-­‐defined	  deputy	  mayor.	  	  In	  the	  past,	  the	  deputy	  mayor	  was	  the	  member	  of	  the	  Board	  of	  Control	  who	  received	  the	  most	  votes.	  	  Today,	  the	  position	  is	  assigned	  on	  a	  rotating	  basis	  from	  the	  chairs	  of	  the	  council’s	  standing	  committees.	  	  	  	   Overall,	  Chip	  Martin	  believes	  a	  system	  of	  government	  is	  only	  as	  good	  as	  the	  people	  who	  are	  elected.	  	  At	  the	  end	  of	  his	  interview,	  Chip	  sagely	  asks,	  “Can	  you	  design	  a	  system	  that	  is	  impermeable	  to	  the	  people	  delivering	  it?”	  	  (B.	  Martin)	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Phil	  McLeod	  	   As	  the	  former	  Editor	  in	  Chief	  of	  London’s	  primary	  daily	  newspaper,	  The	  
London	  Free	  Press,	  Philip	  McLeod	  (70)	  knows	  the	  city	  well.	  	  Now	  retired,	  Phil	  writes	  a	  blog	  called	  The	  McLeod	  Report,	  detailing	  many	  of	  the	  debates	  at	  city	  hall.	  	  Phil	  McLeod	  begins	  the	  interview	  by	  reflecting	  that	  “the	  performance	  of	  the	  idea	  itself	  is	  directly	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  performers”,	  referring	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  in	  reality,	  how	  well	  London’s	  civic	  government	  is	  able	  to	  provide	  service	  to	  citizens	  is	  entirely	  a	  factor	  how	  effective	  the	  members	  of	  council	  are.	  	  McLeod	  says	  that,	  theoretically,	  the	  ward	  realignment	  should	  be	  able	  to	  improve	  citizen	  engagement,	  make	  council	  more	  accountable	  and	  create	  an	  environment	  where	  there	  is	  a	  more	  cohesive	  alignment	  of	  neighbourhood	  interests.	  	  He	  says,	  “This	  works	  very	  well	  when	  you	  have	  a	  councillor	  that	  works	  very	  well.”	  	  In	  practice,	  however,	  he	  believes	  realignment	  was	  more	  successful	  in	  some	  specific	  neighbourhoods	  than	  it	  was	  in	  others.	  	  Phil	  specifically	  cites	  Wards	  4,	  6,	  8	  and	  11	  as	  areas	  that	  have	  benefited	  from	  realignment	  as	  these	  have	  clearly	  identifiable	  and	  aligned	  neighbourhoods	  whereas	  in	  Wards	  1,	  9,	  12	  and	  14,	  the	  shared	  community	  interests	  aren’t	  as	  evident.	  	  In	  Ward	  9,	  Phil	  believes	  that	  the	  Lambeth	  and	  Byron	  neighbourhoods	  have	  very	  different	  characters	  and	  probably	  should	  not	  have	  ended	  up	  in	  the	  same	  electoral	  district.	  	  McLeod	  laments	  that	  there	  was	  not	  a	  better	  way	  to	  apply	  the	  ‘equal	  representation	  rule’	  (the	  guidelines	  for	  establishing	  electoral	  boundaries)	  since	  having	  to	  make	  each	  ward	  relatively	  equal	  in	  population	  results	  in	  the	  need	  to	  put	  potentially	  incompatible	  neighbourhoods	  within	  one	  ward,	  as	  was	  the	  case	  in	  ward	  9.	  	  He	  says,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  needing	  to	  balance	  wards	  by	  population,	  the	  issue	  of	  divergent	  interests	  in	  wards	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that	  was	  supposed	  to	  be	  eliminated	  by	  moving	  to	  the	  14-­‐ward	  system	  continues	  to	  exist	  in	  some	  areas.	  	  	  	   Are	  ward	  councillors	  more	  accountable	  now	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  smaller,	  one	  councillor	  wards?	  	  McLeod	  believes	  they	  are	  but	  that	  it	  is	  dependent	  on	  knowing	  what	  ward	  one	  actually	  lives	  in.	  	  He	  thinks	  it’s	  easier	  to	  identify	  a	  councillor’s	  performance	  but	  that	  there	  still	  are	  many	  Londoners	  who	  don’t	  know	  what	  ward	  they	  live	  in	  and,	  therefore,	  may	  not	  know	  who	  their	  councillor	  is.	  	  Phil	  suggests	  that	  this	  might	  be	  alleviated	  if	  the	  wards	  were	  given	  proper	  names	  describing	  the	  neighbourhoods	  they	  encompass	  rather	  than	  having	  numerical	  assignments.	  	  	  	  	   When	  the	  new	  wards	  were	  formed,	  there	  was	  a	  notion	  that	  councillors	  would	  be	  forced	  to	  take	  a	  citywide	  perspective,	  but	  Phil	  believes	  that	  there	  has	  been	  less	  of	  a	  citywide	  focus	  and	  more	  examples	  of	  councillors	  pandering	  to	  their	  wards.	  	  He	  thinks	  this	  is,	  in	  part,	  more	  apparent	  since	  the	  removal	  of	  the	  Board	  of	  Control,	  and	  also	  in	  part	  due	  to	  poor	  leadership	  from	  the	  current	  mayor.	  	  The	  leadership	  vacuum	  has	  made	  it	  difficult	  to	  get	  the	  members	  of	  council	  to	  work	  together	  to	  advance	  the	  city’s	  interests.	  	  Now,	  McLeod	  reflects,	  council	  is	  far	  less	  proactive	  in	  pursuing	  a	  cohesive	  vision	  for	  the	  city	  than	  it	  should	  be	  and	  is	  left	  to	  spend	  more	  time	  reacting	  to	  issues	  as	  they	  arise.	  	  	  	  	   There	  has	  been	  a	  bit	  of	  change	  in	  the	  level	  of	  citizen	  engagement	  at	  the	  ward	  level,	  but	  Phil	  believes	  that	  many	  politicians	  do	  not	  really	  understand	  how	  to	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effectively	  engage	  their	  constituents.	  	  He	  sees	  the	  civic	  administration	  significantly	  improving	  their	  efforts	  to	  collaborate	  with	  citizens	  but	  characterizes	  councillor	  engagement	  as	  clumsy.	  McLeod	  notes	  that	  many	  councillor-­‐led	  public	  participation	  meetings	  are	  handled	  poorly	  by	  the	  committee	  chairs	  and	  that	  members	  of	  the	  public	  are	  often	  cut	  off	  or	  handled	  rudely	  when	  they	  try	  to	  speak.	  	  This	  has	  led	  to	  public	  frustration	  with	  city	  council.	  	  He	  also	  feels	  that	  some	  councillors	  may	  not	  wish	  to	  enhance	  the	  mechanisms	  for	  citizen	  engagement	  as	  “the	  more	  citizens	  are	  engaged,	  the	  more	  a	  threat	  this	  becomes	  to	  a	  councillor’s	  power.”	  	  	   One	  of	  the	  indirect	  results	  of	  the	  ward	  realignment	  was	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  city	  task	  force	  to	  investigate	  how	  best	  to	  improve	  the	  city’s	  governance.	  	  The	  Governance	  Task	  Force	  was	  comprised	  of	  members	  of	  council	  and	  the	  public.	  	  During	  the	  discussions,	  one	  recommendation	  of	  the	  task	  force	  was	  to	  form	  ‘community	  councils’	  to	  empower	  citizens	  to	  address	  smaller,	  regional	  issues	  leaving	  members	  of	  council	  free	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  strategic	  issues	  of	  the	  city.	  	  The	  issue	  didn’t	  gain	  much	  traction	  but	  if	  you	  want	  to	  have	  an	  effective,	  engaged	  council,	  “…you’ve	  got	  to	  give	  the	  neighbourhood	  the	  ability	  to	  make	  some	  decisions	  for	  themselves”,	  says	  McLeod.	  	  	  	  	   As	  Phil	  considers	  whether,	  on	  balance,	  the	  realignment	  was	  beneficial	  or	  detrimental	  to	  London,	  he	  says,	  “Anything	  would	  have	  been	  an	  improvement	  over	  the	  old	  system.	  	  The	  plusses	  outweigh	  the	  minuses	  by	  a	  considerable	  degree,	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however,	  if	  any	  government	  is	  going	  to	  work,	  you	  still	  need	  good	  people	  running	  it.”	  (McLeod)	  	  	  	  
The	  Academics	  	  
Sam	  Trosow	  	  	   Dr.	  Sam	  Trosow	  (60)	  is	  a	  professor	  of	  Law	  and	  Media	  &	  Information	  Studies	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Western	  Ontario.	  	  In	  2005,	  he	  led	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  coalition	  of	  Londoners	  who	  were	  upset	  that	  city	  council	  had	  chosen	  not	  to	  take	  any	  action	  to	  implement	  changes	  to	  council	  structure	  after	  the	  2003	  referendum.	  	  	  Working	  with	  the	  members	  of	  Imagine	  London,	  Sam	  helped	  to	  develop	  an	  alternative	  14	  ward	  model	  and	  petitioned	  the	  City	  to	  enact	  it,	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  reflected	  the	  desires	  expressed	  by	  Londoners	  during	  the	  referendum.	  	  Dr.	  Trosow’s	  legal	  experience	  proved	  to	  be	  instrumental	  in	  convincing	  the	  Ontario	  Municipal	  Board	  to	  implement	  the	  new	  ward	  boundaries.	  	  	  	  	   Today,	  Trosow	  continues	  to	  support	  the	  ward	  realignment.	  	  “I	  stand	  by	  my	  assertion	  that	  the	  smaller	  the	  size	  of	  the	  ward,	  the	  closer	  people	  will	  feel	  connected	  to	  it”,	  he	  says.	  	  He	  goes	  on	  to	  add	  that	  in	  smaller	  voting	  areas,	  the	  need	  for	  expensive	  election	  campaigns	  is	  reduced,	  thus	  reducing	  the	  reliance	  on	  contributors	  such	  as	  land	  developers.	  	  He	  believes	  there	  may	  still	  be	  some	  refinement	  of	  the	  current	  boundaries	  warranted,	  but	  the	  14	  ward	  have	  proven	  to	  be	  the	  right	  number	  even	  though	  he	  feels	  they	  are	  still	  somewhat	  large.	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   Dr.	  Trosow	  recalls	  how	  opponents	  of	  realignment	  worried	  that	  moving	  from	  seven	  wards	  to	  14	  may	  lead	  to	  calls	  later	  for	  an	  even	  larger	  council.	  	  He	  laughs	  at	  the	  suggestion	  when	  he	  considers	  some	  recent	  controversial	  activities	  of	  the	  current	  council.	  	  He	  says,	  “It’s	  hard	  to	  argue	  for	  a	  larger	  council	  while	  watching	  such	  a	  dysfunctional	  one.”	  	  	  	  	   With	  respect	  to	  community	  engagement,	  Sam	  believes	  that	  the	  realignment	  has	  made	  a	  positive	  impact.	  	  While	  he	  believes	  the	  majority	  of	  members	  of	  the	  current	  council	  have	  not	  been	  effective	  at	  engaging	  the	  public,	  he	  says	  the	  2006	  to	  2010	  council	  was	  “pretty	  close	  to	  an	  ideal	  situation	  in	  terms	  of	  encouraging	  involvement.	  	  They	  made	  people	  feel	  they	  could	  make	  a	  difference.”	  	  He	  believes	  this	  was	  directly	  attributable	  to	  the	  new,	  smaller	  wards.	  	  He	  also	  feels	  that	  councillors	  are	  probably	  paying	  more	  attention	  to	  the	  issues	  in	  their	  wards	  then	  they	  used	  to	  and	  that	  this	  has	  provided	  a	  better	  level	  of	  service	  to	  Londoners.	  	  	  	  	   Dr.	  Trosow	  feels	  a	  large	  success	  of	  the	  realignment	  was	  the	  promotion	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  residents	  living	  in	  areas	  with	  lower	  voter	  turnout.	  	  Since	  turnout	  in	  the	  core	  of	  the	  city	  was	  so	  low	  as	  compared	  to	  the	  subdivisions,	  residents	  in	  the	  core	  were	  easy	  to	  ignore.	  	  Trosow	  believes	  that	  the	  realignment	  equalized	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  city’s	  diverse	  neighbourhoods.	  There	  were	  legitimate	  principles	  and	  concerns	  driving	  the	  desire	  to	  have	  boundaries	  that	  better	  reflected	  “communities	  of	  interest”	  such	  as	  the	  city’s	  downtown.	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   Sam	  says,	  “It	  would	  be	  tempting,	  but	  wrong,	  to	  judge	  its	  success	  this	  early,”	  but	  agrees	  that	  it	  is	  prudent	  to	  evaluate	  the	  effects	  of	  realignment.	  	  He	  is	  surprised	  that	  there	  is	  no	  legislated	  requirement	  for	  municipalities	  to	  review	  their	  electoral	  boundaries	  and	  believes	  the	  City	  should	  be	  holding	  regular	  reviews	  of	  the	  goodness	  of	  those	  boundaries.	  	  	  	  	   Dr.	  Trosow	  feels	  that	  the	  Imagine	  London	  objectives	  of	  improving	  citizen	  engagement,	  better	  representing	  London’s	  communities	  of	  interest	  and	  reducing	  the	  effects	  of	  “developer	  money”	  in	  election	  campaigns	  were	  accomplished.	  	  Reflecting,	  he	  says,	  “If	  I	  could	  push	  a	  button	  and	  send	  everything	  back?	  …I	  don’t	  think	  I’d	  push	  that	  button.”	  (Trosow)	  	  
Andrew	  Sancton	  	  	  	   Dr.	  Andrew	  Sancton	  (65)	  is	  a	  political	  science	  professor	  specializing	  in	  municipal	  government	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Western	  Ontario	  and	  was	  closely	  involved	  in	  the	  Ontario	  Municipal	  Board	  case	  for	  the	  ward	  boundary	  redistribution	  in	  2005.	  	  He	  has	  been	  a	  resident	  in	  London	  for	  26	  years.	  	  Dr.	  Sancton	  was	  a	  paid	  consultant	  for	  the	  City	  of	  London	  and	  testified	  on	  their	  behalf	  before	  the	  OMB	  arguing	  against	  redistricting	  at	  the	  time.	  	  His	  experience	  as	  an	  academic	  studying	  municipal	  government	  had	  led	  him	  to	  be	  concerned	  that	  the	  elimination	  of	  the	  Board	  of	  Control	  and	  creating	  smaller,	  more	  numerous	  wards	  would	  result	  in	  council	  losing	  its	  ability	  to	  maintain	  objective	  advocacy	  for	  the	  citywide	  issues	  facing	  London.	  	  Dr.	  Sancton	  refers	  to	  the	  City	  of	  Toronto	  where	  powerful	  ward	  interests	  in	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the	  suburban	  districts	  of	  the	  city	  dominate	  the	  municipal	  agenda	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  a	  broader	  citywide	  vision.	  	  He	  felt	  that	  the	  previous	  system	  with	  the	  Board	  of	  Control	  and	  broad	  electoral	  districts	  that	  included	  the	  city’s	  core	  helped	  to	  insulate	  London	  from	  the	  effects	  experienced	  by	  Toronto	  and	  was	  concerned	  that	  London’s	  downtown	  wouldn’t	  get	  as	  much	  attention	  under	  redistricting.	  	  Today,	  Sancton	  finds	  himself	  somewhat	  removed	  from	  London’s	  municipal	  affairs	  but	  offers	  his	  observations	  from	  an	  academic	  perspective.	  	  	  	   Upon	  reflection,	  Dr.	  Sancton	  does	  not	  believe	  that	  redistricting	  made	  things	  any	  worse	  for	  downtown.	  	  He	  can’t	  say	  that	  councillors	  in	  suburban	  wards	  seem	  any	  less	  interested	  in	  downtown	  than	  before,	  but,	  he	  comments,	  these	  are	  still	  early	  days	  since	  the	  implementation	  of	  redistricting.	  	  However,	  he	  concedes,	  “my	  fears	  about	  downtown	  turned	  out	  not	  to	  be	  justified.”	  	  	   Do	  the	  smaller	  wards	  make	  it	  easier	  for	  citizens	  to	  connect	  with	  their	  municipal	  government?	  	  Dr.	  Sancton	  believes	  that	  in	  principle	  that	  it	  would	  and	  it	  appears	  that	  it	  has.	  	  He	  remarks	  that	  it	  doesn’t	  appear	  that	  there	  are	  as	  many	  ward	  boundaries	  cutting	  through	  established	  neighbourhoods	  as	  there	  was	  previously	  and	  now	  it	  is	  probably	  easier	  for	  neighbourhood	  associations	  to	  have	  strong	  connections	  with	  their	  ward	  councillor.	  	  Sancton	  considers	  the	  point	  that	  prior	  to	  2006,	  citizens	  had	  a	  second	  councillor	  to	  turn	  to	  when	  they	  couldn’t	  find	  resonance	  with	  the	  first,	  but	  he	  doesn’t	  feel	  that	  this	  was	  the	  strongest	  argument	  in	  favour	  of	  keeping	  the	  previous	  system.	  	  Dr.	  Sancton	  continues	  to	  on	  say	  that	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	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assume	  that	  it	  is	  now	  easier	  for	  people	  to	  vote	  and	  understand	  their	  ballots	  having	  to	  only	  learn	  about	  one	  councillor	  in	  their	  ward.	  	  He	  thinks	  that	  if	  voter	  turnout	  since	  redistricting	  was	  shown	  to	  be	  significantly	  higher,	  it	  would	  support	  that	  argument.	  	  	  	  	   “I	  think	  that	  on	  the	  balance,	  they’ve	  done	  well…Most	  councillors	  have	  done	  a	  pretty	  good	  job	  of	  balancing	  local	  and	  citywide	  issues,”	  says	  Sancton.	  	  He	  considers	  a	  couple	  examples	  of	  building	  developments	  in	  neighbourhoods	  and	  wonders	  if	  these	  would	  have	  had	  different	  outcomes	  under	  the	  previous	  ward	  system	  but	  concludes	  that	  there	  probably	  would	  not	  have	  been	  much	  difference.	  	  	  	  	  	   While	  remaining	  relatively	  neutral	  in	  his	  opinion	  on	  whether	  redistricting	  has	  been	  beneficial,	  as	  a	  previous	  opponent	  of	  London’s	  redistricting,	  Dr.	  Sancton	  does	  not	  now	  believe	  there	  has	  been	  any	  harm	  done	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  initiative.	  	  He	  cautions,	  however,	  that	  the	  potential	  may	  still	  exist	  for	  regional	  divisive	  politics	  to	  emerge	  as	  it	  has	  in	  cities	  like	  Toronto	  and	  it	  would	  be	  prudent	  to	  continue	  to	  observe	  for	  such	  effects	  on	  an	  ongoing	  regular	  basis.	  	  (Sancton)	  	  
The	  Community	  Associations	  
The	  Urban	  Core	  Perspective	  	   Greg	  Thompson	  (57),	  Wendy	  Dickenson	  (42)	  and	  Wes	  Kinghorn	  (45)	  are	  neighbourhood	  leaders	  from	  two	  of	  the	  city’s	  core	  areas.	  	  Thompson	  has	  been	  heavily	  involved	  in	  the	  Old	  East	  Village	  Community	  Association	  since	  2002.	  	  
	   42	  
Kinghorn	  and	  Dickenson	  have	  also	  been	  extensively	  involved	  in	  their	  community	  association	  in	  the	  Woodfield	  neighbourhood	  over	  the	  same	  period	  as	  Thompson.	  	  ‘Old	  East’	  makes	  up	  the	  southern	  half	  of	  Ward	  4	  and	  Woodfield	  is	  one	  of	  four	  neighbourhoods	  in	  downtown’s	  Ward	  13.	  	  	  	  	   Greg	  Thompson	  did	  not	  support	  ward	  realignment	  in	  2005	  and	  remains	  unconvinced	  that	  it	  has	  been	  beneficial	  for	  his	  neighbourhood	  or	  the	  city.	  	  However,	  he	  adds,	  that	  it	  is	  largely	  dependent	  on	  who	  is	  elected	  to	  be	  the	  councillors	  in	  each	  ward.	  	  He	  recounts	  that,	  under	  the	  old	  system,	  there	  was	  one	  councillor	  who	  was	  not	  a	  very	  effective	  representative	  for	  his	  community	  while	  the	  other	  was	  quite	  involved.	  	  As	  well,	  three	  wards	  under	  the	  previous	  alignment	  shared	  Old	  East,	  allowing	  for	  representation	  from	  almost	  a	  third	  of	  the	  members	  of	  council.	  	  To	  illustrate	  the	  reduction	  in	  representation,	  Thompson	  remarks	  that	  the	  councillor	  currently	  representing	  his	  ward	  has	  chosen	  not	  to	  have	  a	  seat	  on	  the	  local	  Business	  Improvement	  Area	  board	  and,	  instead,	  a	  councillor	  from	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  city	  acts	  as	  city	  council’s	  representative	  to	  the	  body.	  	  Greg	  feels	  now	  that	  his	  community	  is	  often	  forced	  to	  seek	  the	  assistance	  of	  councillors	  from	  other	  wards,	  as	  they	  do	  not	  find	  much	  traction	  with	  their	  representative.	  	  	  	  	   Wendy	  Dickenson	  agrees	  that	  ultimately	  effective	  representation	  boils	  down	  to	  the	  personality	  of	  the	  representative	  but	  she	  strongly	  believes	  things	  have	  vastly	  improved	  for	  her	  community	  since	  the	  realignment.	  	  Dickenson	  and	  Kinghorn	  were	  initially	  strongly	  supportive	  of	  the	  initiative	  to	  realign	  and	  remain	  so	  today.	  	  They	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both	  feel	  that	  their	  community	  has	  experienced	  a	  significant	  increase	  in	  engagement	  with	  city	  hall	  as	  a	  result	  of	  realignment.	  	  Kinghorn	  observes	  that	  there	  has	  always	  been	  an	  interest	  in	  the	  “flagship”	  projects	  of	  downtown	  (i.e.	  the	  John	  Labatt	  Centre,	  Covent	  Garden	  Market	  and	  the	  Convention	  Centre)	  but	  that	  there	  had	  traditionally	  been	  little	  recognition	  of	  the	  smaller,	  neighbourhood	  interests	  of	  the	  core.	  	  He	  believes	  that	  there	  has	  been	  a	  marked	  increase	  in	  interest	  from	  city	  hall	  in	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  affairs	  of	  the	  core	  neighbourhoods	  as	  communities,	  rather	  than	  just	  the	  traditional	  interest	  in	  the	  commercial	  district.	  	  Often,	  these	  interests	  found	  themselves	  in	  conflict	  and,	  as	  a	  result,	  the	  residents	  of	  Ward	  13	  were	  involved	  in	  numerous	  appeals	  to	  the	  Ontario	  Municipal	  Board.	  	  Dickenson	  notes	  that	  since	  realignment,	  the	  community	  has	  not	  been	  to	  the	  OMB	  once.	  	  She	  equally	  credits	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  her	  councillor	  and	  the	  new	  ward	  construct.	  	  	  	  	   For	  Kinghorn,	  one	  unexpected	  result	  of	  the	  realignment	  was	  that	  his	  community	  started	  to	  become	  more	  involved	  with	  the	  neighbouring	  communities	  within	  the	  ward.	  Linkages	  were	  established	  where	  they	  didn’t	  exist	  before	  as	  they	  started	  to	  realize	  they	  had	  much	  in	  common.	  	  Wes	  and	  Wendy	  both	  believe	  that	  Greg’s	  neighbourhood	  in	  Old	  East	  should	  have	  also	  been	  included	  in	  the	  downtown	  ward	  as	  it	  has	  more	  common	  interests	  with	  the	  core	  neighbourhoods	  than	  with	  those	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  Ward	  4.	  	  Again,	  Dickenson	  credits	  the	  vigilance	  of	  her	  councillor	  in	  helping	  to	  facilitate	  those	  linkages.	  	  She	  remembers	  saying	  of	  the	  old	  Ward	  2	  in	  which	  they	  were	  located,	  “We	  have	  nothing	  in	  common	  with	  the	  suburban	  parts	  of	  the	  ward.”	  	  Kinghorn	  had	  been	  concerned	  at	  the	  time	  of	  realignment	  that	  his	  new	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ward	  would	  become	  somewhat	  of	  an	  island	  but	  that	  this	  didn’t	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  an	  issue	  in	  the	  end.	  	  	  	  	   None	  of	  the	  three	  believed	  that	  the	  realignment	  caused	  any	  real	  impairment	  in	  council’s	  ability	  to	  focus	  on	  citywide	  issues.	  Whether	  as	  a	  result	  of	  realignment	  or	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  current	  economic	  climate	  (Thompson	  believes	  it	  to	  be	  more	  of	  the	  latter)	  they	  say	  there	  is	  more	  of	  a	  discussion	  on	  the	  broader	  city	  affairs	  (budget,	  property	  development,	  etc.).	  	  Kinghorn	  muses	  that	  perhaps	  creating	  single	  councillor	  wards	  has	  had	  a	  spinoff	  effect	  of	  forcing	  councillors	  to	  take	  a	  citywide	  perspective	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  need	  to	  form	  alliances	  to	  advance	  their	  own	  objectives.	  	  	  	  	   Thompson,	  Dickenson	  and	  Kinghorn	  all	  agreed	  that	  there	  was	  now	  more	  direct	  accountability	  of	  elected	  officials	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  ward	  realignments.	  	  With	  one	  councillor	  in	  each	  ward,	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  representation	  is	  directly	  attributable	  to	  the	  councillor.	  	  Dickenson	  remarks	  that	  she	  has	  “often	  thought	  that	  shared	  responsibility	  meant	  no	  responsibility”,	  in	  reference	  to	  the	  previous	  two-­‐councillor-­‐per-­‐ward	  system.	  	  She	  also	  says	  that	  the	  accountability	  effect	  is	  almost	  undeniable	  and	  it	  makes	  the	  best	  councillors	  work	  even	  harder	  because	  they	  know	  that	  “the	  buck	  stops	  with	  them.”	  	  Thompson	  observes	  that	  when	  one’s	  representative	  is	  not	  being	  effective	  on	  council,	  the	  community	  only	  has	  to	  work	  to	  unseat	  one	  person.	  	  Similarly,	  Dickenson	  notes	  that	  it	  is	  much	  easier	  now	  for	  a	  community	  to	  come	  together	  and	  work	  hard	  to	  get	  a	  sympathetic	  councillor	  elected.	  	  She	  also	  believes	  that	  realignment	  made	  the	  local	  government	  much	  easier	  to	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understand	  for	  the	  average	  citizen	  as	  one	  council	  member	  is	  now	  directly	  related	  to	  a	  district	  as	  opposed	  to	  having	  two	  councillors	  and	  four	  controllers	  who	  may	  (or	  may	  not)	  share	  interest	  in	  that	  area.	  	  However,	  Thompson	  feels	  there	  may	  not	  be	  all	  that	  much	  difference	  to	  average	  citizens	  as	  many	  were	  not	  even	  aware	  the	  change	  had	  occurred.	  	  He	  recalls	  during	  his	  candidacy	  for	  city	  council	  in	  2010	  that	  some	  people	  on	  the	  doorstep	  had	  told	  him	  they	  were	  voting	  for	  a	  councillor	  who	  had	  not	  been	  their	  representative,	  or	  run	  in	  their	  ward,	  since	  2003.	  	  	  	  	   While	  split	  on	  the	  overall	  effects	  of	  the	  realignment,	  Kinghorn	  and	  Thompson	  both	  agree	  that	  it	  is	  still	  early	  to	  determine	  what	  sort	  of	  lasting	  legacy	  will	  be	  left	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  ward	  realignment.	  	  Dickenson	  and	  Kinghorn	  both	  strongly	  believe	  that	  the	  city	  and	  their	  neighbourhood	  have	  been	  advantaged	  through	  realignment.	  	  They	  also	  have	  a	  very	  favourable	  view	  of	  their	  councillor	  though	  Kinghorn	  remarks	  that	  even	  prior	  to	  realignment,	  their	  neighbourhood	  had	  had	  a	  strong	  councillor.	  	  He	  thinks	  that	  the	  neighbourhood’s	  history	  of	  strong	  representation	  makes	  for	  a	  good	  control	  to	  evaluate	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  ward	  boundary	  redistribution.	  	  	  	   Conversely,	  Thompson	  has	  not	  been	  impressed	  with	  his	  current	  representative	  and	  has	  not	  been	  convinced	  that	  the	  ward	  realignment	  has	  had	  a	  net	  benefit	  for	  the	  city.	  	  He	  feels	  that	  there	  was	  an	  erroneous	  belief	  that	  the	  realignment	  would	  fix	  a	  toxic	  climate	  that	  existed	  in	  prior	  councils.	  	  He	  cites	  the	  difficulties	  experienced	  by	  the	  current	  city	  council	  and	  believes	  such	  a	  climate	  still	  exists	  today.	  	  (Dickenson,	  Kinghorn	  and	  Thompson)	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The	  Suburban	  /	  Rural	  Perspective	  	  	   Geoff	  Faul	  (65),	  Joan	  Boyce	  (63),	  Cathy	  Melo	  (54)	  and	  Ellie	  Westeinde	  (65)	  are	  members	  of	  the	  Lambeth	  Community	  Assocation	  who	  met	  to	  discuss	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  ward	  boundary	  realignment	  on	  their	  neighbourhood.	  	  All	  four	  have	  been	  residents	  of	  London	  and	  Lambeth	  for	  over	  35	  years.	  	  The	  former	  town	  of	  Lambeth	  sits	  in	  the	  southwest	  corner	  of	  London	  and	  was	  assumed	  by	  the	  city	  during	  an	  annexation	  in	  1993.	  	  Byron,	  another	  former	  town	  assumed	  into	  London	  through	  amalgamation,	  is	  also	  included	  with	  Lambeth	  in	  the	  current	  Ward	  9.	  	  Even	  at	  the	  outset	  of	  the	  interview,	  Ellie	  Westeinde	  remarks	  that,	  to	  this	  day,	  the	  agricultural	  community	  around	  Lambeth	  still	  feels	  somewhat	  divorced	  from	  the	  city	  and	  the	  urban/rural	  divide	  continues	  to	  exist	  in	  London.	  	  	  	  	   Geoff	  Faul	  starts	  by	  responding	  to	  a	  question	  about	  what	  he	  perceives	  the	  effects	  of	  having	  one	  councillor	  in	  a	  14-­‐ward	  system	  as	  compared	  to	  having	  two	  councillors	  in	  the	  former	  seven	  ward	  system.	  	  He	  says	  that	  what	  two	  councillors	  provided	  for	  was	  more	  “comfortable”	  access	  to	  council.	  	  With	  two	  councillors	  representing	  their	  neighbourhood,	  it	  allowed	  them	  to	  pick	  and	  choose	  who	  they	  could	  approach	  for	  help.	  	  With	  the	  realignment,	  he	  feels	  their	  community	  lost	  that	  flexibility.	  	  Joan	  Boyce	  joins	  in	  saying	  that	  now	  the	  community	  runs	  the	  danger	  of	  not	  being	  “philosophically	  aligned”	  with	  their	  councillor.	  	  The	  group	  agrees	  that	  there	  is	  a	  reluctance	  to	  seek	  assistance	  from	  councillors	  outside	  their	  ward	  for	  fear	  of	  putting	  that	  councillor	  in	  the	  position	  of	  “stepping	  on	  someone	  else’s	  territory”.	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   The	  new	  Ward	  9	  encompasses	  three	  distinct	  communities:	  Lambeth,	  Byron	  and	  rural	  London	  and	  is	  one	  of	  the	  geographically	  largest	  wards	  in	  the	  city.	  	  This	  has	  made	  it	  hard	  to	  find	  a	  representative	  that	  truly	  understands	  all	  the	  issues	  in	  the	  ward,	  says	  Boyce.	  	  For	  a	  period	  after	  annexation,	  they	  recall	  a	  councillor	  named	  Ben	  Veale	  assigned	  to	  represent	  a	  short-­‐lived	  rural/agricultural	  ward.	  	  The	  group	  agrees	  that	  this	  was	  the	  last	  time	  there	  was	  someone	  on	  council	  who	  was	  sincerely	  connected	  with	  the	  concerns	  and	  needs	  of	  London’s	  rural	  residents.	  	  Nonetheless,	  the	  group	  does	  see	  some	  advantages	  to	  the	  new	  ward	  system.	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  a	  statement	  made	  by	  Phil	  McLeod	  during	  his	  interview,	  Geoff	  Faul	  observes	  that	  there	  is	  actually	  a	  “social	  affinity”	  between	  the	  communities	  of	  Lambeth	  and	  Byron	  so	  there	  is	  some	  sense	  in	  grouping	  the	  two	  in	  the	  same	  ward.	  	  Having	  smaller	  wards	  makes	  it	  easier	  for	  councillors,	  in	  general,	  to	  grasp	  the	  issues	  of	  the	  district,	  says	  Faul.	  	  They	  also	  believe	  that	  the	  smaller	  wards	  and	  the	  elimination	  of	  the	  Board	  of	  Control	  have	  forced	  councillors	  to	  give	  better	  attention	  to	  citywide	  issues.	  	  However,	  Faul	  notes,	  effectiveness	  is	  still	  a	  function	  of	  who	  is	  chosen	  to	  be	  the	  representative.	  	  Some	  councillors	  are	  more	  attuned	  to	  the	  citywide	  issues,	  while	  others	  remain	  in	  their	  silos,	  he	  says.	  	  Though	  with	  the	  current	  council	  in	  particular,	  Boyce	  observes,	  councillors	  are	  often	  more	  concerned	  in	  voting	  with	  a	  bloc	  of	  like-­‐minded	  peers	  rather	  than	  being	  able	  to	  give	  independent	  thought	  to	  the	  balance	  between	  citywide	  and	  ward	  specific	  interests.	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   These	  representatives	  of	  the	  Lambeth	  Community	  Association	  remain	  fairly	  neutral	  on	  their	  opinions	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  realignment	  on	  their	  neighbourhood.	  	  Throughout	  the	  interview,	  the	  members	  carefully	  drew	  out	  examples	  of	  the	  benefits	  and	  disadvantages	  of	  the	  new	  ward	  system.	  	  They	  believe	  that	  perhaps	  the	  new	  wards	  have	  increased	  the	  importance	  of	  their	  association	  in	  lobbying	  city	  hall	  due	  to	  their	  longevity	  as	  a	  group	  due	  to	  their	  established	  networks.	  	  This	  has	  led	  to	  London’s	  other	  rural	  settlements	  in	  neighbouring	  wards	  seeking	  assistance	  and	  collaboration	  with	  the	  Lambeth	  Community	  Association.	  	  For	  this	  region	  of	  the	  city,	  the	  group	  believes	  that	  the	  success	  of	  their	  new	  ward	  will	  be	  very	  dependent	  on	  having	  a	  representative	  that	  can	  deftly	  navigate	  the	  nuances	  of	  the	  urban/rural	  divide.	  	  (Boyce,	  Faul	  and	  Melo)	  
	  
The	  Politicians	  
Joni	  Baechler	  	  	   Joni	  Baechler	  (53)	  has	  been	  living	  in	  London	  for	  34	  years	  and	  has	  been	  intimately	  involved	  in	  London’s	  municipal	  affairs	  for	  over	  20	  years.	  	  Joni	  first	  became	  involved	  through	  her	  community	  association	  in	  the	  Masonville	  neighbourhood,	  then	  with	  the	  Urban	  League	  of	  London	  (an	  umbrella	  group	  representing	  the	  city’s	  neighbourhood	  associations),	  serving	  as	  it’s	  president	  from	  1999	  until	  2000	  when	  she	  was	  elected	  to	  city	  council.	  	  She	  has	  continued	  to	  serve	  on	  council	  since	  that	  time.	  	  Her	  perspective	  on	  the	  ward	  boundary	  redistribution	  is	  important,	  as	  she	  has	  served	  two	  terms	  on	  city	  council	  prior	  to	  the	  redistribution	  and	  two	  terms	  afterwards.	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   In	  2005,	  Councillor	  Baechler	  was	  a	  strong	  supporter	  of	  the	  ward	  boundary	  initiative	  and	  advocated	  for	  such	  change	  on	  council.	  	  When	  her	  colleagues	  chose	  to	  take	  no	  action	  in	  response	  to	  the	  results	  of	  the	  2003	  referendum	  on	  council	  structure,	  Joni	  continued	  to	  support	  further	  public	  consultation	  and	  the	  work	  of	  
Imagine	  London	  as	  it	  began	  it’s	  appeal	  to	  the	  Ontario	  Municipal	  Board.	  	  Councillor	  Baechler	  also	  testified	  at	  the	  OMB	  hearing	  in	  2005	  in	  favour	  of	  smaller	  wards	  and	  having	  one	  councillor	  in	  each	  of	  those	  wards.	  	  	  	   In	  interviewing	  Councillor	  Baechler,	  she	  details	  her	  reasons	  for	  her	  support	  at	  the	  time	  with	  precise	  recall.	  	  She	  believes	  the	  redistribution	  has	  had	  a	  marked	  impact	  in	  allowing	  for	  greater	  accountability	  and	  transparency	  of	  city	  council.	  	  Citizens	  know	  who	  is	  responsible	  for	  their	  ward	  and	  can	  see	  whether	  their	  councillor	  is	  doing	  the	  job	  they	  were	  elected	  for.	  	  Joni	  felt	  that	  under	  the	  old	  system	  with	  two	  councillors	  in	  each	  ward,	  one	  of	  the	  councillors	  could	  underperform	  through	  their	  term	  leaving	  their	  ward	  partner	  to	  do	  more	  work	  without	  it	  being	  noticed	  by	  the	  constituents.	  	  And,	  she	  says,	  disparate	  levels	  of	  councillor	  activity	  did	  indeed	  often	  occur	  with	  one	  usually	  “pulling	  the	  lion’s	  share”.	  	  Baechler	  also	  notes	  that	  now	  a	  councillor	  can	  “take	  the	  ball	  and	  run	  with	  it”,	  referring	  to	  advocacy	  for	  ward	  issues.	  	  Previously,	  she	  saw	  many	  instances	  where	  the	  councillors	  in	  a	  ward	  worked	  in	  opposite	  directions	  on	  certain	  files,	  often	  undermining	  the	  other’s	  efforts.	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Some	  proponents	  of	  the	  two-­‐councillor-­‐per-­‐ward	  system	  argued	  that	  the	  structure	  allowed	  for	  a	  sharing	  of	  the	  workload	  between	  the	  council	  mates.	  	  Baechler	  states	  that	  the	  opposite	  has	  proved	  true.	  	  She	  says	  that	  the	  smaller	  size	  of	  the	  new	  wards	  allows	  for	  a	  far	  more	  manageable	  and	  focused	  workload	  for	  councillors.	  	  She	  describes	  the	  workload	  in	  the	  old	  ward	  system	  as	  “feeling	  like	  I	  was	  underwater	  breathing	  through	  a	  straw.”	  	  The	  smaller	  wards	  have	  allowed	  her	  now	  to	  provide	  a	  greater	  focus	  on	  a	  smaller	  region.	  	  During	  election	  campaigns,	  Baechler	  notes,	  candidates	  would	  often	  prioritize	  canvassing	  activities	  to	  polling	  districts	  with	  the	  highest	  voter	  turnout	  leaving	  many	  homes	  unvisited	  in	  areas	  with	  lower	  voter	  turnout.	  	  With	  the	  current	  wards,	  Councillor	  Baechler	  has	  been	  able	  to	  have	  more	  meaningful	  engagement	  with	  stakeholders	  in	  her	  communities	  since	  there	  are	  fewer	  of	  them.	  	  This	  has	  also	  allowed	  her	  to	  have	  a	  better	  work-­‐life	  balance.	  	  In	  fact,	  during	  the	  interview,	  Joni	  says	  unequivocally	  that	  if	  the	  redistribution	  had	  not	  occurred,	  she	  would	  not	  have	  run	  for	  re-­‐election	  in	  2006.	  	  	   Councillor	  Baechler	  feels	  that	  it	  is	  also	  now	  easier	  for	  citizens	  to	  lobby	  their	  councillors	  faster	  and	  more	  effectively.	  	  Under	  the	  former	  system,	  a	  concerned	  Londoner	  would	  possibly	  need	  to	  contact	  up	  to	  seven	  council	  members	  (two	  councillors,	  four	  controllers	  and	  the	  mayor)	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  each	  member	  representing	  them	  understood	  their	  issues.	  	  Now	  the	  necessary	  contacts	  are	  reduced	  to	  two	  -­‐	  their	  own	  councillor	  and	  the	  mayor.	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When	  asked	  about	  citizen	  engagement,	  Baechler,	  like	  Chip	  Martin,	  also	  cites	  the	  Reservoir	  Hill	  development,	  however	  Baechler	  believes	  that	  the	  new	  system	  provides	  more	  benefit	  in	  such	  situations.	  	  Although	  citizens	  may	  occasionally	  find	  that	  their	  ward	  councillor	  does	  not	  share	  their	  own	  views,	  they	  will	  find	  another	  member	  of	  council	  who	  is	  sympathetic	  to	  their	  position	  regardless	  of	  what	  ward	  they	  represent.	  	  This	  can	  help	  to	  create	  more	  interest	  by	  councillors	  in	  neighbourhood	  issues	  even	  when	  those	  issues	  aren’t	  in	  their	  own	  ward.	  	  When	  two	  councillors	  represented	  a	  ward,	  if	  those	  councillors	  disagreed	  with	  each	  other	  on	  a	  matter	  such	  as	  Reservoir	  Hill,	  their	  votes	  would	  cancel	  each	  other	  out	  leaving	  the	  remaining	  councillors	  from	  other	  wards	  to	  make	  the	  decision.	  	  	  	   “Citizens	  now	  feel	  that	  their	  municipal	  government	  is	  more	  accessible	  than	  before,”	  she	  says.	  Baechler	  also	  admits,	  however,	  that	  this	  may	  not	  only	  be	  a	  function	  of	  the	  redesign	  of	  council	  but	  also	  of	  social	  media,	  electronic	  communications	  and	  changes	  in	  the	  engagement	  approaches	  of	  the	  civic	  administration.	  	  Social	  media,	  she	  muses,	  will	  have	  a	  huge	  impact	  on	  how	  council	  relates	  to	  citizens	  since	  electronic	  communications	  are	  “wardless.”	  	  	  	   Councillor	  Baechler	  does	  not	  believe	  that	  there	  has	  been	  any	  material	  change	  in	  the	  level	  of	  advocacy	  for	  the	  core	  or	  peripheral	  regions	  of	  the	  city	  since	  realignment	  because	  she	  thinks	  council	  has	  always	  had	  a	  high	  level	  of	  interest	  in	  helping	  these	  regions.	  	  She	  points	  to	  council’s	  Millennium	  Plan	  created	  before	  realignment	  and	  the	  Downtown	  Master	  Plan	  created	  after,	  both	  key	  strategies	  for	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revitalizing	  the	  city’s	  core.	  	  Baechler	  also	  does	  not	  believe	  that	  there	  has	  been	  any	  change	  in	  the	  ability	  of	  members	  of	  council	  to	  work	  for	  both	  ward	  issues	  and	  citywide	  issues.	  	  She	  does	  feel,	  though,	  that	  since	  the	  elimination	  of	  the	  Board	  of	  Control,	  councillors	  have	  a	  greater	  responsibility	  to	  citywide	  issues	  than	  they	  did	  before.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  councillors	  must	  have	  a	  greater	  knowledge	  base	  and	  more	  opportunity	  for	  active	  participation	  in	  citywide	  issues	  formerly	  addressed	  by	  the	  Board	  of	  Control.	  	  	  	   Councillor	  Baechler	  unreservedly	  supports	  the	  realignment	  and	  feels	  that	  it	  has	  had	  significant	  beneficial	  impact	  in	  council’s	  ability	  to	  represent	  its	  citizens.	  (Baechler)	  	  	  
Note:	  
The	  second	  municipal	  politician	  interviewed	  for	  this	  paper	  has	  requested	  that	  their	  
comments	  not	  be	  made	  publicly	  available	  at	  this	  time.	  	  They	  have	  been	  omitted	  in	  this	  
copy	  as	  per	  that	  request.	  	  	   	  
	   53	  
Chapter	  5	  –	  Results	  
Voter	  Turnout	  	   Participation	  in	  London’s	  municipal	  elections	  is	  possibly	  the	  most	  quantifiable	  indicator	  of	  civic	  engagement.	  	  To	  assess	  this,	  poll	  by	  poll	  results	  for	  the	  2000,	  2003,	  2006	  and	  2010	  elections	  were	  obtained	  from	  the	  Clerk’s	  office	  for	  the	  City	  of	  London.	  	  	   Changes	  in	  voting	  turnout	  between	  elections	  were	  evaluated	  both	  ward-­‐by-­‐ward	  and	  citywide	  and	  examined	  for	  trends	  over	  four	  periods:	  2000	  to	  2010;	  2000	  to	  2006;	  2003	  to	  2006;	  and,	  2003	  to	  2010.	  	  All	  four	  periods	  spanned	  over	  the	  2006	  election	  when	  the	  changes	  to	  the	  ward	  boundary	  were	  first	  implemented.	  	  These	  periods	  were	  selected	  to	  test	  if	  trends	  in	  voter	  turnout	  held	  consistently	  across	  analyses	  and	  to	  mitigate	  any	  results	  that	  may	  have	  been	  attributable	  to	  a	  hotly	  contested	  race	  at	  either	  the	  ward	  or	  mayoral	  level	  in	  any	  given	  election.	  	  	  	  	   From	  2000	  to	  2010,	  voter	  turnout	  increased	  in	  London	  from	  32.75%	  to	  39.91%.	  	  A	  sharp	  jump	  in	  turnout	  was	  noted	  between	  2003	  and	  2006	  when	  the	  new	  wards	  were	  first	  implemented,	  increasing	  from	  35.92%	  to	  42.93%.	  	  The	  citywide	  numbers	  were	  compared	  against	  turnout	  in	  each	  of	  the	  wards	  to	  isolate	  any	  particular	  trends	  in	  specific	  neighbourhoods.	  	  Wards	  4,	  6,	  11,	  and	  13	  are	  identified	  as	  the	  urban	  wards,	  as	  none	  of	  these	  wards	  touch	  on	  the	  city’s	  boundary	  (Appendix	  3).	  	  Wards	  1,	  2,	  3,	  5,	  7,	  8,	  9,	  12	  and	  14	  are	  identified	  as	  the	  suburban	  /	  rural	  wards	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and	  all	  share	  a	  boundary	  with	  the	  city’s	  periphery.	  	  Ward	  10	  is	  also	  suburban	  /	  rural,	  on	  the	  city’s	  west	  side,	  but	  does	  not	  extend	  to	  the	  city	  edge.	  	  	   When	  examined,	  a	  trend	  clearly	  emerged	  in	  the	  changes	  in	  voting	  behaviours	  between	  residents	  in	  the	  urban	  wards	  versus	  those	  in	  the	  surburban	  /	  rural	  wards	  (Table	  1.).	  	  Wards	  4	  (Old	  East)	  and	  13	  (Downtown,	  Woodfield,	  SoHo)	  in	  the	  city’s	  core	  experienced	  statistically	  significant	  increases	  in	  turnout	  across	  all	  four	  periods	  evaluated.	  	  Ward	  6	  (Old	  North,	  University,	  Sherwood	  Forest)	  at	  the	  northern	  edge	  of	  the	  core	  experienced	  significant	  increases	  in	  voter	  turnout	  in	  the	  periods	  between	  2003	  and	  2006,	  and	  2003	  and	  2010	  (Figure	  2	  &	  3).	  	  When	  evaluated	  between	  2000	  and	  2010,	  the	  trend	  in	  Ward	  6	  is	  not	  as	  evident.	  	  The	  other	  urban	  ward,	  Ward	  11	  (Old	  South,	  Southcrest),	  showed	  relatively	  stable	  voter	  turnout	  through	  all	  periods	  evaluated.	  	  	  
Figure	  2.	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Figure	  3.	  
	  
Table	  1.	  Change	  in	  Voter	  Turnout	  Over	  Four	  Elections	  Between	  2000	  &	  2010.	  
Ward	   %	  change	  '00-­‐‘10	   %	  change	  '00-­‐‘06	   %	  change	  ‘03-­‐‘06	   %	  change	  ‘03-­‐‘10	  
1	   26.57	   34.67	   16.72	   9.70	  
2	   24.16	   28.88	   22.06	   17.59*	  
3	   37.56**	   41.91*	   15.16	   11.63	  
4	   41.63**	   63.31**	   37.15**	   18.94**	  
5	   9.00**	   21.55*	   18.25	   6.04	  
6	   18.03	   29.22	   43.03**	   30.65**	  
7	   19.04	   25.18	   7.94**	   2.65**	  
8	   10.70**	   34.55	   27.40*	   4.81*	  
9	   1.81**	   8.59**	   	  -­‐1.14**	   -­‐7.31**	  
10	   12.82**	   17.12**	   7.58**	   3.62*	  
11	   21.29	   26.02	   15.55	   11.22	  
12	   26.15	   32.60	   24.09	   18.05*	  
13	   28.16	   53.37**	   44.80**	   20.99**	  
14	   31.96**	   33.67	   21.27	   19.72**	  
London	   21.87	   31.08	   19.52	   11.12	  
Confidence	  Interval	  
	   	   	  p	  =	  .05	  (*)	   6.45	   8.05	   7.67	   5.61	  
p	  =	  .01	  (**)	   8.99	   11.23	   10.69	   7.82	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   By	  contrast,	  voter	  turnout	  changes	  in	  some	  suburban	  wards	  were	  significantly	  lower	  than	  the	  changes	  citywide	  over	  the	  evaluated	  periods.	  	  Wards	  5	  (Masonville,	  Stoneybrook),	  9	  (Byron,	  Lambeth)	  and	  10	  (Westmount)	  experienced	  changes	  that	  were	  not	  consistent	  with	  the	  citywide	  number;	  however,	  all	  three	  wards	  maintained	  voter	  participation	  rates	  higher	  than	  the	  overall	  citywide	  participation	  rate	  (Figure	  4.).	  	   Figure	  4.	  	  
	  	  	   A	  very	  interesting	  result	  came	  from	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  gap	  between	  the	  ward	  with	  the	  lowest	  voter	  turnout	  and	  the	  ward	  with	  the	  highest	  turnout	  (Table	  2.).	  	  This	  gap	  decreased	  consistently	  in	  each	  election	  from	  2003	  to	  2010.	  	  In	  2003,	  the	  gap	  between	  low	  and	  high	  was	  26.95%,	  where	  the	  lowest	  turnout	  was	  in	  Ward	  13	  at	  25.58%	  and	  the	  highest	  was	  in	  Ward	  9	  at	  52.53%.	  	  In	  2003,	  a	  resident	  in	  Ward	  9	  was	  2.05	  times	  more	  likely	  to	  vote	  than	  a	  resident	  in	  Ward	  13.	  	  By	  contrast,	  in	  2010	  the	  
	   57	  
gap	  had	  decreased	  to	  only	  14.91%	  with	  a	  resident	  in	  Ward	  9	  only	  1.44	  times	  more	  likely	  to	  vote	  than	  a	  resident	  in	  Ward	  4	  (the	  wards	  with	  highest	  and	  lowest	  turnout	  in	  that	  year).	  	  	  	  
Table	  2.	  Voter	  Turnout	  By	  
Ward	  (%)	  
	   	   	  Ward	   2000	   2003	   2006	   2010	  
1	   29.13	   33.61	   39.23	   36.87	  
2	   29.02	   30.64	   37.40	   36.03	  
3	   25.53	   31.46	   36.23	   35.12	  
4	   23.85	   28.40	   38.95	   33.78	  
5	   41.42	   42.58	   50.35	   45.15	  
6	   32.72	   29.56	   42.28	   38.62	  
7	   33.87	   39.28	   42.40	   40.32	  
8	   41.3	   43.62	   55.57	   45.72	  
9	   47.82	   52.53	   51.93	   48.69	  
10	   39	   42.46	   45.68	   44.00	  
11	   35.55	   38.77	   44.80	   43.12	  
12	   29.29	   31.30	   38.84	   36.95	  
13	   24.15	   25.58	   37.04	   30.95	  
14	   30.41	   33.52	   40.65	   40.13	  
London	   32.75	   35.92	   42.93	   39.91	  
Range	  (high-­‐low)	   23.97	   26.95	   19.34	   14.91	  
Ratio	  (high/low)	   1.980124224	   2.053557467	   1.533811758	   1.441385435	  	  	  	   Overall,	  voter	  turnout	  in	  almost	  all	  of	  the	  city’s	  core	  areas	  was	  lower	  in	  all	  four	  elections	  than	  the	  overall	  turnout	  citywide	  while	  turnout	  in	  many	  of	  the	  city’s	  peripheral	  wards	  was	  higher.	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Homeowner	  and	  Household	  Income	  Effects	  	   Upon	  determining	  the	  average	  household	  income	  and	  the	  proportion	  of	  homes	  owned	  versus	  those	  rented	  in	  each	  ward,	  comparisons	  were	  made	  to	  determine	  the	  strength	  of	  correlation	  between	  these	  factors	  and	  voter	  turnout	  (Table	  3)	  (Appendix	  7).	  	  As	  expected	  from	  previous	  research,	  strong	  correlations	  were	  shown	  to	  be	  present	  between	  both	  homeownership	  and	  income	  with	  voter	  turnout	  in	  London	  (Figure	  5	  &	  6.).	  	  These	  relationships	  were	  then	  further	  evaluated	  to	  determine	  if	  any	  changes	  occurred	  in	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  variables.	  	  	  	  
Table	  3.	  Ranking	  Demographic	  Indicators	  vs.	  Voter	  Turnout	  (1=highest,	  14=lowest)	  
	  	   Demographic	  Indicators	  
	  
Voter	  Turnout	  
	  Ward	   Homeowners	   Income	   2000	   2003	   2006	   2010	  
1	   8	   13	   10	   7	   9	   10	  
2	   6	   11	   11	   11	   12	   11	  
3	   11	   7	   12	   9	   14	   12	  
4	   12	   14	   14	   13	   10	   14	  
5	   3	   4	   2	   3	   3	   3	  
6	   9	   1	   7	   12	   7	   8	  
7	   5	   3	   6	   5	   6	   6	  
8	   2	   5	   3	   2	   1	   2	  
9	   1	   2	   1	   1	   2	   1	  
10	   10	   6	   4	   4	   4	   4	  
11	   13	   12	   5	   6	   5	   5	  
12	   7	   10	   9	   10	   11	   9	  
13	   14	   9	   13	   14	   13	   13	  
14	   4	   8	   8	   8	   8	   7	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Figure	  5.	  
	  	   Figure	  6.	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   For	  both	  homeownership	  and	  income,	  the	  Pearson	  coefficients	  decreased	  somewhat	  between	  2003	  and	  2006	  suggesting	  some	  weakening	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  these	  variables	  and	  voter	  turnout,	  but	  the	  change	  was	  not	  shown	  to	  be	  of	  a	  magnitude	  considered	  to	  be	  significant.	  	  The	  relationships	  subsequently	  strengthened	  once	  more	  in	  2010.	  	  	  	  
Budget	  	   Three	  departmental	  budget	  lines	  of	  the	  City	  of	  London’s	  municipal	  operations	  budget	  were	  evaluated	  to	  determine	  if	  any	  changes	  to	  expenditures	  had	  occurred	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  ward	  boundary	  realignment.	  	  Data	  was	  available	  on	  the	  City	  of	  London	  website	  for	  the	  budget	  years	  from	  2002	  until	  2011	  (Appendix	  8).	  	  Changes	  in	  the	  expenditures	  in	  Parks	  and	  Recreation,	  Neighbourhood	  and	  Children’s	  Services	  and	  Elected	  Officials	  budget	  lines	  over	  the	  period	  observed	  were	  almost	  all	  lower	  than	  the	  amount	  of	  change	  in	  the	  City’s	  overall	  operations	  budget	  in	  the	  same	  period.	  	  However,	  when	  the	  four	  years	  prior	  to	  realignment	  were	  compared	  against	  the	  four	  years	  after	  realignment,	  some	  changes	  were	  noticed	  (Figure	  7).	  	  In	  the	  period	  between	  2002	  and	  2006,	  both	  the	  Elected	  Officials	  line	  and	  the	  Neighbourhood	  and	  Children’s	  Services	  line	  increased	  at	  relatively	  the	  same	  rate	  as	  that	  of	  the	  overall	  operations	  budget	  for	  the	  City.	  	  The	  budget	  line	  for	  Parks	  and	  Recreation	  increased	  at	  only	  half	  the	  rate	  of	  the	  growth	  in	  the	  City’s	  operations	  budget.	  	  When	  the	  period	  between	  2007	  and	  2011	  is	  examined,	  the	  budget	  line	  for	  Parks	  and	  Recreation	  increases	  to	  catch	  up	  with,	  and	  pass,	  the	  rate	  of	  change	  for	  the	  City	  operation	  budget,	  the	  Neighbourhood	  and	  Children’s	  Services	  line	  holds	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somewhat	  consistent	  with	  the	  City	  budget	  and	  the	  rate	  of	  change	  in	  the	  Elected	  Officials	  line	  is	  markedly	  lower	  than	  the	  overall	  change	  in	  the	  City	  budget.	  	  	  
Figure	  7.	  
	  
 
 
Of note, the cost of governance in London (Elected Officials) did not show any 
marked decrease until 2011, the first full year reported after the dissolution of the Board 
of Control.  In 2011, the cost associated with elected officials decreased by 3.6% over the 
previous year.   
 
Campaign Expenses 	  	   Campaign	  expenses	  for	  winning	  ward	  councillor	  candidates	  in	  the	  2000,	  2003	  and	  2010	  elections	  were	  examined	  for	  trends	  possibly	  associated	  with	  realignment.	  	  Campaign	  expense	  maximums	  for	  each	  ward	  were	  calculated	  using	  the	  formula	  assigned	  by	  the	  Ontario	  Municipal	  Elections	  Act	  ($5000	  plus	  $0.85	  per	  registered	  voter	  in	  the	  ward	  in	  which	  they’re	  running)	  (Table	  4.).	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Table	  4.	  
	   2000	   2003	   2006	   2010	  
Ward	  Councillor	  Expense	  Limit	   $35,110.64	   $37,373.46	   $19,515.15	   $20,908.84	  
Average	  Campaign	  Expense	   $9,413.14	   $12,585.33	   Not	  available	   $14,127.50	  	   There	  was	  a	  substantial	  reduction	  in	  the	  average	  ward	  councillor	  campaign	  expense	  limit	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  reduction	  in	  ward	  size.	  Prior	  to	  realignment,	  council	  candidates	  could	  spend	  over	  $35,000	  on	  their	  campaigns.	  	  After	  realignment,	  this	  amount	  was	  less	  than	  $21,000.	  	  It	  is	  difficult	  to	  show	  that	  this	  has	  had	  any	  impact	  on	  campaign	  financing	  as	  the	  average	  campaign	  expenses	  have	  increased	  in	  line	  with	  the	  rate	  of	  inflation	  between	  2000	  and	  2010	  (Fig.	  8.).	  	  However,	  in	  2010,	  there	  were	  four	  winning	  candidates	  who	  spent	  the	  maximum	  allowable	  amounts	  on	  their	  campaigns	  (as	  compared	  to	  none	  who	  came	  anywhere	  close	  to	  the	  expenditure	  ceiling	  in	  either	  the	  2000	  or	  2003	  elections).	  	  Campaign	  contributions	  from	  business	  entities	  continue	  to	  play	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  election	  financing.	  In	  2010,	  only	  26%	  of	  all	  contributions	  to	  winning	  campaigns	  came	  from	  unaffiliated	  individuals.	  	  	  
Figure	  8.	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Themes	  Arising	  from	  the	  Interviews	  	  In	  eight	  interviews,	  thirteen	  Londoners	  with	  various	  connections	  to	  the	  community	  and	  vested	  interest	  in	  the	  ward	  boundary	  realignment	  provided	  interesting	  and	  insightful	  commentary	  on	  the	  political	  landscape	  in	  the	  seven	  years	  since	  the	  change.	  	  The	  subjects	  had	  an	  average	  age	  of	  58	  years	  and	  had	  lived	  in	  London,	  on	  average,	  for	  37	  years.	  	  	  	  Overall,	  the	  majority	  of	  respondents	  had	  favourable	  perspectives	  of	  the	  realignment.	  	  	  Their	  cited	  reasons	  for	  support	  included	  a	  perceived	  increase	  accountability	  of	  councillors,	  improved	  linkages	  and	  collaboration	  between	  neighbourhoods,	  an	  improved	  sense	  of	  connection	  between	  neighbourhoods	  and	  councillors,	  and	  an	  improvement	  in	  the	  ability	  for	  candidates	  to	  properly	  canvass	  the	  ward	  during	  elections.	  	  Respondents	  generally	  saw	  improvements	  in	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  neighbourhood	  interests	  were	  addressed	  in	  the	  city’s	  core	  and	  noted	  a	  continued	  interest	  by	  the	  civic	  government	  in	  the	  viability	  of	  the	  core’s	  commercial	  enterprises.	  	  Several	  noted	  that	  the	  increased	  interest	  and	  activity	  in	  the	  peripheral	  wards	  of	  the	  city	  was	  likely	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  desire	  by	  some	  currently	  on	  council	  to	  use	  these	  lands	  to	  spur	  economic	  development	  rather	  than	  through	  any	  sense	  of	  community	  building.	  	  	  	  Many	  of	  those	  interviewed	  had	  noticed	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  level	  of	  community	  engagement	  exercised	  by	  the	  civic	  administration.	  	  As	  examples,	  they	  identified	  two	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major	  initiatives:	  ReThink	  London	  –	  the	  City’s	  current	  process	  of	  revising	  the	  Official	  Plan;	  and,	  Strengthening	  Neighbourhoods	  -­‐	  a	  staff	  initiated	  program	  to	  help	  support	  social	  activity	  within	  communities.	  	  The	  respondents	  were	  reluctant	  to	  attribute	  the	  collaborative	  nature	  of	  these	  projects	  to	  the	  ward	  boundary	  redistribution	  but	  rather,	  perhaps,	  to	  a	  growing	  general	  trend	  of	  citizens	  looking	  to	  have	  input	  on	  public	  process	  and	  policy.	  	  	  Most	  respondents	  did	  not	  believe	  that	  the	  smaller,	  single	  councillor	  wards	  resulted	  in	  any	  difference	  in	  a	  councillor’s	  ability	  to	  represent	  both	  neighbourhood	  and	  citywide	  interests.	  	  Those	  who	  were	  not	  convinced	  of	  the	  realignment’s	  success	  in	  creating	  connections	  between	  neighbourhoods	  and	  councillors,	  were	  concerned	  about	  the	  ability	  of	  councillors	  to	  balance	  the	  neighbourhood	  and	  citywide	  perspectives	  and	  were	  also	  generally	  dissatisfied	  with	  their	  current	  representative.	  	  The	  most	  common	  perceived	  detriment	  of	  the	  ward	  realignment	  cited	  by	  respondents	  was	  the	  loss	  of	  the	  second	  ward	  councillor	  to	  whom	  they	  could	  turn	  when	  finding	  their	  representative	  unsympathetic	  to	  their	  concerns.	  	  When	  this	  concern	  was	  explored	  further,	  each	  person	  who	  had	  mentioned	  this	  concern	  stated	  that	  they	  were	  able	  to	  find	  another	  member	  of	  council	  in	  another	  ward	  to	  assist	  with	  the	  issue.	  	  	  	  Respondents	  identified	  areas	  for	  improving	  the	  current	  system	  that	  included	  establishing	  a	  better	  manner	  for	  choosing	  a	  Deputy	  Mayor;	  allowing	  minor	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realignments	  to	  the	  current	  ward	  boundaries	  to	  better	  reflect	  the	  communities	  within;	  and,	  creating	  some	  vehicle	  to	  improve	  the	  understanding	  of,	  and	  representation	  for,	  the	  rural	  areas	  of	  the	  city.	  	  	  While	  not	  a	  question	  in	  the	  interview,	  many	  respondents	  did	  bring	  up	  the	  Board	  of	  Control	  without	  prompt	  and	  their	  opinions	  were	  very	  divided.	  	  Those	  lamenting	  the	  abolition	  of	  the	  Board	  believed	  city	  council	  had	  lost	  a	  central	  body	  that	  was	  more	  experienced	  and	  better	  suited	  to	  address	  citywide	  issues.	  	  Those	  who	  were	  happy	  to	  see	  the	  Board	  dissolved	  believed	  that	  there	  was	  now	  more	  responsibility	  for	  councillors	  to	  learn	  about	  the	  operations	  of	  the	  City	  and	  have	  a	  broader	  appreciation	  for	  issues	  beyond	  their	  wards.	  	  	  	  Although	  several	  subjects	  interviewed	  said	  that	  the	  new	  structure	  of	  local	  government	  was	  much	  better	  than	  what	  was	  previously	  in	  place,	  what	  was	  most	  interesting	  was	  every	  single	  respondent	  mentioned,	  without	  prompt,	  that	  what	  was	  more	  important	  than	  any	  model	  of	  government	  was	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  representative	  who	  served	  in	  it.	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Chapter	  6	  –	  Discussion	  
	   After	  seven	  years,	  most	  of	  the	  passions	  surrounding	  the	  ward	  boundary	  realignment	  have	  subsided	  and	  now,	  instead,	  conversation	  turns	  to	  reflection.	  	  Surprisingly,	  considering	  the	  amount	  of	  controversy	  generated	  when	  the	  OMB	  ordered	  the	  City	  to	  enact	  a	  bylaw	  to	  redivide	  the	  City’s	  wards,	  there	  has	  never	  been	  a	  formal	  analysis	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  that	  decision.	  	  	  	  The	  findings	  from	  this	  analysis	  have	  shown	  some	  very	  intriguing	  results	  from	  both	  the	  quantitative	  and	  qualitative	  assessments.	  	  One	  of	  the	  main	  stated	  objectives	  of	  Imagine	  London	  in	  their	  request	  to	  the	  OMB,	  was	  to	  provide	  improved	  representation	  for	  the	  city’s	  “communities	  of	  interest”,	  especially	  in	  the	  core	  areas	  of	  the	  city	  where	  voter	  turnout	  was	  lowest.	  	  This	  study	  has	  clearly	  shown	  that	  voter	  turnout	  was	  significantly	  increased	  in	  these	  areas	  and,	  seemingly,	  as	  a	  direct	  result	  of	  the	  new	  wards.	  	  More	  importantly,	  voter	  turnout	  remained	  elevated	  in	  the	  core	  wards	  in	  the	  second	  election	  after	  realignment.	  	  As	  well,	  the	  difference	  in	  voter	  turnout	  between	  wards	  was	  markedly	  reduced.	  	  While	  turnout	  in	  a	  few	  suburban	  wards	  did	  not	  increase	  by	  the	  same	  margin	  as	  the	  overall	  citywide	  turnout	  did,	  these	  levels	  held	  steady	  at	  near	  or	  just	  above	  50%.	  	  This	  might	  indicate	  that	  there	  perhaps	  is	  a	  ceiling	  to	  voter	  participation	  in	  London	  that	  is	  near	  50%	  turnout.	  	  One	  other	  theory	  is	  that	  since	  much	  of	  the	  new	  housing	  development	  occurs	  in	  the	  suburban	  regions	  of	  the	  city,	  many	  of	  the	  residents	  in	  these	  regions	  may	  not	  have	  lived	  in	  the	  ward	  for	  a	  long	  period	  of	  time.	  	  Length	  of	  time	  living	  in	  a	  neighbourhood	  has	  been	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shown	  to	  be	  positively	  correlated	  with	  increased	  voter	  turnout	  (Geys).	  	  This	  introduces	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  lower	  than	  average	  increase	  in	  turnout	  in	  the	  suburban	  wards	  is	  as	  a	  result	  of	  new	  residents	  moving	  into	  new	  suburban	  developments.	  	  	  	  While	  positive	  correlations	  were	  shown	  between	  voter	  turnout	  and	  the	  demographic	  indicators	  of	  homeownership	  and	  household	  income,	  there	  was	  no	  strong	  evidence	  that	  there	  was	  much	  change	  to	  this	  relationship	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  ward	  boundary	  realignment.	  	  	  	  	   It	  was	  argued	  before	  the	  OMB	  that	  smaller	  wards	  would	  reduce	  the	  reliance	  of	  candidates	  on	  funding	  from	  business	  entities	  such	  as	  land	  developers	  as	  the	  cost	  of	  canvasing	  a	  smaller	  area	  would	  be	  less.	  	  	  Campaign	  expenditures	  do	  not	  appear	  to	  have	  been	  directly	  impacted	  by	  the	  ward	  boundary	  realignment	  at	  this	  time	  despite	  the	  reduction	  in	  ward	  size	  and	  the	  marked	  reduction	  in	  the	  campaign	  expense	  limit	  for	  ward	  councillors.	  	  This	  indicates	  that	  there	  is	  generally	  accepted	  perception	  of	  the	  amount	  of	  money	  required	  to	  be	  a	  viable	  candidate	  for	  councillor.	  	  Currently,	  that	  amount	  sits	  around	  $14,000.	  	  But,	  as	  the	  elections	  after	  the	  realignment	  were	  the	  first	  time	  that	  candidates	  in	  ward	  races	  had	  ever	  spent	  to	  their	  expense	  limit	  and,	  as	  the	  formula	  for	  calculating	  these	  limits	  has	  not	  changed	  recently	  to	  adjust	  for	  inflation,	  in	  coming	  elections	  it	  is	  foreseeable	  that	  more	  candidates	  will	  spend	  the	  maximum	  amount	  allowable.	  	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  reduced	  expense	  limit	  will	  certainly	  play	  more	  of	  a	  role	  in	  future	  years.	  	  It	  seems	  evident	  that	  the	  only	  way	  to	  impact	  the	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role	  campaign	  contributions	  from	  businesses	  or	  unions	  play	  in	  municipal	  elections	  is	  to	  prohibit	  them	  in	  a	  manner	  similar	  to	  that	  currently	  employed	  by	  the	  City	  of	  Toronto	  (Spears).	  	  	  	  	   The	  results	  from	  evaluating	  the	  municipal	  budget	  provided	  for	  some	  intrigue.	  	  The	  budget	  for	  elected	  officials	  decreased,	  as	  expected,	  in	  2011	  after	  the	  abolition	  of	  the	  Board	  of	  Control.	  	  This	  represented	  a	  reduction	  in	  council	  size	  of	  about	  20%	  but	  overall	  expenses	  only	  decreased	  by	  4%	  as	  compared	  to	  the	  previous	  year	  (Appendix	  8).	  	  This	  budget	  line	  includes	  discretionary	  spending	  by	  councillors,	  office	  expenses,	  and	  administrative	  support	  and	  the	  disproportionate	  reduction	  in	  overall	  expense	  to	  the	  reduction	  in	  members	  of	  council	  seems	  to	  indicate	  much	  of	  the	  cost	  of	  governance	  resides	  in	  fixed	  costs	  and	  that	  the	  actual	  size	  of	  council	  has	  little	  impact	  on	  the	  overall	  budget.	  	  	  	  In	  the	  end,	  it	  seems	  apparent	  from	  the	  changes	  in	  voter	  turnout	  and	  from	  the	  interviews	  with	  those	  providing	  their	  insights	  for	  this	  research,	  that	  London’s	  communities	  of	  interest	  have	  been	  better	  reflected	  in	  the	  new	  ward	  map.	  	  It	  also	  seems	  apparent	  that	  improved	  connections	  have	  been	  made	  not	  only	  between	  neighbourhoods	  and	  city	  council,	  but	  also	  between	  the	  different	  neighbourhoods	  themselves.	  	  The	  interview	  subjects	  seemed	  to	  generally	  believe	  that	  the	  ward	  realignment	  resulted	  in	  improved	  overall	  results	  for	  the	  city	  while	  only	  one	  respondent	  believed	  that	  the	  current	  structure	  was	  worse	  than	  before.	  	  Opinion	  was	  generally	  split	  as	  to	  whether	  the	  current	  structure	  was	  improved	  through	  the	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elimination	  of	  the	  Board	  of	  Control.	  	  Oddly	  enough,	  in	  the	  very	  small	  sample	  of	  Londoners	  who	  were	  interviewed	  for	  this	  research,	  their	  opinions	  still	  seem	  to	  mimic	  the	  results	  of	  the	  2003	  referendum	  on	  council	  structure,	  which	  resulted	  in	  strong	  support	  for	  reducing	  the	  size	  of	  council	  and	  lukewarm	  support	  for	  eliminating	  the	  Board	  of	  Control.	  	  	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  ward	  boundary	  realignment	  itself	  did	  not	  satisfy	  the	  direction	  from	  the	  results	  of	  the	  referendum.	  	  The	  direction	  to	  council	  from	  the	  referendum	  was	  realized	  when	  council,	  itself,	  voted	  to	  abolish	  the	  Board	  of	  Control	  in	  the	  term	  after	  redistribution,	  which	  left	  both	  conditions	  fulfilled	  (smaller	  council	  without	  Board	  of	  Control).	  	  However,	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  conclude	  that	  the	  ward	  boundary	  distribution	  became	  the	  catalyst	  for	  the	  restructuring	  events	  that	  followed.	  	  	  	  History	  provides	  important	  lessons.	  	  In	  their	  bid	  to	  rid	  local	  government	  of	  corruption	  and	  inept	  politicians,	  the	  urban	  reformers	  at	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  20th	  Century	  removed	  much	  of	  the	  control	  of	  municipal	  assets	  out	  of	  the	  hands	  individual	  councillors	  and	  into	  the	  care	  of	  a	  professionalized	  civil	  service.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  reformers	  actions	  to	  decrease	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  political	  machines	  of	  the	  day	  also	  led	  to	  a	  decrease	  in	  the	  voting	  power	  of	  the	  lower	  and	  working	  classes	  and	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  power	  of	  the	  middle	  and	  upper	  classes.	  	  The	  reformers	  also	  found	  that	  their	  reforms	  did	  not	  necessarily	  improve	  the	  quality	  of	  representatives	  in	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municipal	  government.	  	  The	  effects	  of	  less	  qualified	  councillors	  were,	  however,	  mitigated	  by	  the	  presence	  of	  learned	  civic	  staff.	  	  	  These	  events	  lend	  powerful	  context	  to	  the	  current	  state	  of	  local	  governments	  in	  London,	  in	  Canada	  and	  abroad.	  	  While	  there	  have	  been	  few	  cases	  of	  corruption	  of	  municipal	  councillors	  since	  the	  urban	  reform	  movement	  over	  100	  years	  ago,	  there	  has	  been	  a	  startling	  increase	  in	  the	  cases	  of	  corruption	  and	  questionable	  conduct	  involving	  mayors.	  	  Over	  the	  past	  year,	  four	  mayors	  in	  Ontario	  and	  Quebec	  have	  been	  charged	  with	  corruption	  or	  conflicts	  of	  interest	  (Simpson).	  	  Many	  of	  the	  subjects	  interviewed	  in	  this	  paper	  were	  also	  greatly	  concerned	  about	  the	  level	  of	  competence	  displayed	  by	  some	  of	  the	  current	  members	  of	  London’s	  city	  council	  and	  also	  observed	  that	  the	  current	  council	  seems	  much	  more	  involved	  in	  the	  administrative	  functions	  of	  local	  government	  than	  in	  setting	  of	  policy.	  	  	  While	  the	  ward	  boundary	  redistribution	  in	  London	  appears	  to	  have	  provided	  more	  equal	  representation	  for	  the	  socioeconomic	  and	  geographic	  communities	  of	  interest,	  one	  is	  left	  to	  wonder	  will	  new	  urban	  reforms	  need	  to	  be	  undertaken	  to	  address	  the	  modern	  day	  issues	  of	  corruption	  and	  meddling	  shown	  by	  some	  of	  today’s	  members	  of	  local	  government.	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  1.	  City	  of	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  Ward	  Map	  1993	  to	  2006
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Appendix	  2.	  Proposed	  Ward	  Map	  –	  Imagine	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Appendix	  3.	  Current	  City	  of	  London	  Ward	  Map	  (as	  ordered	  by	  OMB)	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Appendix	  4.	  Ontario	  Cities	  with	  Population	  >	  150,000	  
	  
City	  
Population	  
(2011)	   Government	  Structure	  
#	  of	  
wards	   pop/ward	   Source	  
Sudbury	   160,274	  
Wards	  only	  +	  Mayor	  at	  
large	   12	   13356	   http://www.greatersudbury.ca/inside-­‐city-­‐hall/city-­‐council/	  
Windsor	   210,891	  
Wards	  only	  +	  Mayor	  at	  
large	   10	   21089	   http://www.citywindsor.ca/cityhall/Municipal-­‐Election/Pages/Ward-­‐Maps.aspx	  
London	   366,151	  
Wards	  only	  +	  Mayor	  at	  
large	   14	   26154	   http://www.london.ca/d.aspx?s=/City_Council/default.htm	  
Hamilton	   519,949	  
Wards	  only	  +	  Mayor	  at	  
large	   15	   34663	   http://www.hamilton.ca/YourElectedOfficials/WardCouncillors/	  
Ottawa	   883,391	  
Wards	  only	  +	  Mayor	  at	  
large	   23	   38408	   http://ottawa.ca/en/city-­‐hall/your-­‐city-­‐government/how-­‐does-­‐council-­‐govern-­‐your-­‐city	  
Toronto	   2,615,050	  
Wards	  only	  +	  Mayor	  at	  
large	   44	   59433	   http://app.toronto.ca/im/council/councillors.jsp	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Appendix	  5.	  London	  Planning	  Districts	  
	   80	  
Appendix	  6.	  	  Assignment	  of	  Planning	  Districts	  Into	  Wards	  (Income	  and	  Homeownership)	  
	   	   	   	   	  
Weighted	  
	   	  
Weignted	  
Ward	   District	   Income	   Households	   Weight	   Income	  
%	  
Owners	  
%	  
Renters	   owners	  
1	   Glen	  Cairn	   62176	   3358	   0.343390437	   21351	   63.1	   36.9	   21.67	  
1	   Hamilton	  Rd	   64061	   6420	   0.656609563	   42063	   77.1	   22.9	   50.62	  
	   	   	  
9778	  
	  
63414	  
	   	  
72.29	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
2	   Argyle	   67071	   10685	   0.985701107	   66112	   72.8	   27.2	   71.76	  
2	   Crumlin	   82614	   155	   0.014298893	   1181	   90.3	   9.7	   1.29	  
	   	   	  
10840	  
	  
67293	  
	   	  
73.05	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
3	   Airport	   n/a	   65	   0.00843608	  
	  
100	  
	  
0.84	  
3	   Fanshawe	   n/a	   55	   0.007138222	  
	  
72.7	   27.3	   0.52	  
3	  
Huron	  
Heights	   85753	   7585	   0.984425698	  
	  
59.6	   40.4	   58.67	  
	   	   	  
7705	  
	  
85753	  
	   	  
60.03	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
4	   Carling	   56865	   8285	   0.621064468	   35317	   44.4	   55.6	   27.58	  
4	   East	  London	   56850	   5055	   0.378935532	   21542	   58.8	   41.2	   22.28	  
	   	   	  
13340	  
	  
56859	  
	   	  
49.86	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
5	   Masonville	   153560	   1775	   0.193671577	   29740	   84.2	   15.8	   16.31	  
5	  
Stoney	  
Creek	   76837	   2995	   0.326786688	   25109	   62.4	   37.6	   20.39	  
5	   Stoneybrook	   110455	   2535	   0.276595745	   30551	   97.8	   2.2	   27.05	  
5	   Uplands	   120992	   1860	   0.20294599	   24555	   91.1	   8.9	   18.49	  
	   	   	  
9165	  
	  
109956	  
	   	  
82.24	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
6	   Medway	   83692	   3780	   0.354153654	   29640	   73.3	   26.7	   25.96	  
6	  
North	  
London	   206014	   3795	   0.355559026	   73250	   61.8	   38.2	   21.97	  
6	  
West	  
London	   60754	   3098	   0.29028732	   17636	   75.1	   24.9	   21.80	  
	   	   	  
10673	  
	  
120526	  
	   	  
69.73	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
7	   Fox	  Hollow	   n/a	   45	   0.006417112	  
	  
100	   0	   0.64	  
7	   Hyde	  Park	   99551	   268	   0.038146168	   3797	   95.3	   4.7	   3.64	  
7	   Masonville	   153560	   1775	   0.25311943	   38869	   84.2	   15.8	   21.31	  
7	   Medway	   83692	   3780	   0.539037433	   45113	   73.3	   26.7	   39.51	  
7	   Sunningdale	   142651	   1145	   0.163279857	   23292	   81.7	   18.3	   13.34	  
	   	   	  
7013	  
	  
111072	  
	   	  
78.44	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
8	   Hyde	  Park	   99551	   268	   0.028215	   2809	   95.3	   4.7	   2.69	  
8	   Oakridge	   112091	   6115	   0.644985	   72297	   88.5	   11.5	   57.08	  
	   81	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
8	  
West	  
London	   60754	   3098	   0.326800	   19854	   75.1	   24.9	   24.54	  
	   	   	  
9481	  
	  
94960	  
	   	  
84.31	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
9	   Bostwick	   63097	   170	   0.021164021	   1335	   8.8	   91.2	   0.19	  
9	   Byron	   110443	   5500	   0.684718332	   75622	   88.5	   11.5	   60.60	  
9	   Lambeth	   118578	   1565	   0.194833489	   23103	   91.7	   8.3	   17.87	  
9	   River	  Bend	   143147	   315	   0.039215686	   5614	   96.8	   3.2	   3.80	  
9	  
Sharon	  
Creek	   134827	   150	   0.018674136	   2518	   80	   20	   1.49	  
9	   Talbot	   131372	   130	   0.016184251	   2126	   100	   0	   1.62	  
9	   Tempo	   73658	   78	   0.009648304	   711	   67.7	   32.3	   0.65	  
9	   Woodhull	   114920	   125	   0.01556178	   1788	   84	   16	   1.31	  
	   	   	  
8033	  
	  
112817	  
	   	  
87.52	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
10	   Highland	   78668	   8915	   0.555624805	   43710	   62.5	   37.5	   34.73	  
10	   Westmount	   96727	   7130	   0.444375195	   42983	   62.6	   37.4	   27.82	  
	   	   	  
16045	  
	  
86693	  
	   	  
62.54	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
11	  
South	  
London	   71885	   7165	   0.495504841	   35619	   46.8	   53.2	   23.19	  
11	   Southcrest	   59376	   7295	   0.504495159	   29955	   38.9	   61.1	   19.62	  
	   	   	  
14460	  
	  
65574	  
	   	  
42.81	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
12	   Brockley	   64982	   70	   0.009183339	   597	   85.7	   14.3	   0.79	  
12	   Longwoods	   n/a	   50	   0.006559528	  
	  
80	   20	   0.52	  
12	   Tempo	   73658	   78	   0.010167268	   749	   67.7	   32.3	   0.69	  
12	   White	  Oaks	   67753	   7425	   0.974089866	   65998	   72.9	   27.1	   71.01	  
	   	   	  
7623	  
	  
67343	  
	   	  
73.01	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
13	   Central	   72772	   7120	   0.576829598	   41977	   26.5	   73.5	   15.29	  
13	   Downtown	   72966	   2125	   0.17215771	   12562	   28.9	   71.1	   4.98	  
13	  
West	  
London	   60754	   3098	   0.251012692	   15250	   75.1	   24.9	   18.85	  
	   	   	  
12343	  
	  
69789	  
	   	  
39.11	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
14	   Brockley	   64982	   70	   0.812772134	   52816	   85.7	   14.3	   69.65	  
14	   Glanworth	   96070	   165	   1.915820029	   184053	   87.9	   12.1	   168.40	  
14	   Glen	  Cairn	   62176	   3358	   38.98403483	   2423871	   63.1	   36.9	   2459.89	  
14	   Jackson	   90378	   1210	   14.04934688	   1269752	   98.8	   1.2	   1388.08	  
14	   Westminster	   72507	   3810	   44.23802612	   3207567	   85	   15	   3760.23	  
	   	   	  
8613	  
	  
71381	  
	   	  
78.46	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
LONDON	   84593	   145145	  
	   	  
62.4	   37.6	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Appendix	  7.	  SPSS	  generated	  correlations	  (voter	  turnout	  vs.	  homeowner	  &	  income)	  	  Home	  Ownership	  vs.	  Turnout	  
Correlations 
 @2000 homeowners 
Voter Turnout 
Pearson Correlation 1 .597* 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .019 
N 15 15 
homeowners 
Pearson Correlation .597* 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .019  
N 15 15 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Correlations 
 @2003 homeowners 
@2003 
Pearson Correlation 1 .568* 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .027 
N 15 15 
homeowners 
Pearson Correlation .568* 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .027  
N 15 15 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Correlations 
 @2006 homeowners 
@2006 
Pearson Correlation 1 .523* 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .046 
N 15 15 
homeowners 
Pearson Correlation .523* 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .046  
N 15 15 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Correlations 
 @2010 homeowners 
@2010 
Pearson Correlation 1 .589* 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .021 
N 15 15 
homeowners 
Pearson Correlation .589* 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .021  
N 15 15 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Average Household Income vs. Turnout 
Correlations 
 @2000 AvgIncome 
@2000 
Pearson Correlation 1 .651** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .009 
N 15 15 
AvgIncome 
Pearson Correlation .651** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .009  
N 15 15 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Correlations 
 @2003 AvgIncome 
@2003 
Pearson Correlation 1 .544* 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .036 
N 15 15 
AvgIncome 
Pearson Correlation .544* 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .036  
N 15 15 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Correlations 
 @2006 AvgIncome 
@2006 
Pearson Correlation 1 .573* 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .026 
N 15 15 
AvgIncome 
Pearson Correlation .573* 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .026  
N 15 15 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Correlations 
 @2010 AvgIncome 
@2010 
Pearson Correlation 1 .575* 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .025 
N 15 15 
AvgIncome 
Pearson Correlation .575* 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .025  
N 15 15 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 	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Appendix	  8.	  Selected	  Municipal	  Budget	  Expenses	  
	  
